Project manager and test and evaluation facility relationship by Aanerud, Kenneth Dean et al.
















Thesis Advisors: J. W. Creighton
J. A. Jolly
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
. n






2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. REClPlEN T'3 CAT ALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtllla)
Project Manager and Test and Evaluation
Facility Relationship
5. TYPE OF REPORT 6 PERIOD COVEREO
Master's Thesis;
September 1975





8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERf*,)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT TASK
AREA ft WORK UNIT NUMBERS '





13. NUMBER OF PAGES
161
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS^/ dlttarant from Controlling Ottlca)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
15. SECURITY CLASS, (of thla raport)
Unclassified
15«. DEC LASSIFl CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T (ol thla Raport)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol tha abatract antatad In Block 20, It dlttarant horn Raport)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Contlnua on rararaa alda It nacaaaary and tdanttty by block numbar)
Project Manager
Pacific Missile Test Center
Test and Evaluation
20. ABSTRACT (Contlnua on ravaraa alda It nacaaaary and Idantlty by block numbar)
This thesis investigates the relationship between Washington based
Project Managers and a Test and Evaluation (T&E) facility, the Pacific
Missile Test Center (PMTC). Five areas of the relationship are examined.
First, the formal weapon system acquisition process as prescribed by cur-
rent directives is presented as an overview. Next, the Pacific Missile




DD 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 68 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 |
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whan Data Sntarad)

ffkCUWlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS P«5Ef^M r>*(. Enf.r.5
of funding techniques, and specifically, those employed by PMTC. The
Project Managers' perception of their participation in the T&E process
is presented through results of a questionnaire. Finally, an objective
method of selecting the appropriate T&E facility for a project based on
technical capability is developed.
DD Form 1473
1 Jan 73
S/N 0102-014-G601 security classification of this PAser**** n*f pm,,^,





LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NAVY
U.S.A. E., NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 1974
and
JOHN EDWARD KANE
LIEUTENANT, UNITED STATES NAVY
M.S.A.E., NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 1974
and
MICHAEL BERNARD KELLEY
LIEUTENANT, UNITED STATES NAVY
M.S.A.E., NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, 1974
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







25ntp«vSTGRADUATE schoolMONTEREY. CALIFORNIA 930-3940
ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the relationship between
Washington based Project Managers and a Test and Evaluation
(TSE) facility, the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) . Five
areas of the relationship are examined. First, the formal
weapon system acquisition process as prescribed by current
directives is presented as an overview. Next, the Pacific
Missile Test Center organization is analyzed. This is
followed by an investigation of funding techniques, and
specifically, those employed by PMTC. The Project Managers*
perception of their participation in the TSE process is
presented through results of a questionnaire. Finally, an
objective method of selecting the appropriate TSE facility
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The authors' previous educational background in
Aeronautical Engineering combined with their current
education in Administrative Sciences stimulated interest in
the Weapons System Acquisition Management (WSAH) field. It
was hoped that thesis research in this area would benefit
the authors in future billet assignments in this area. In
order to focus on a specific topic, a literature search of
current research in this area was conducted. The search
indicated a number of interesting problems involving the
Test and Evaluation (r&E) aspects of WSAM. It was
considered desirable to concentrate on the focal point of
T&E, namely, the Washington D.C. arena. However, due to
lack of funding support, trips to the Washington area were
considered impractical. Consequently, problems involving
T&E activities in the local region were investigated.
Contacts were made at both the Naval Weapon Center (NWC)
,
China Lake, and the Pacific Missile Test Center (?MTC)
Point Mugu.
A trip was made to point Mugu for familarization and
problem definition purposes. Personnel at Point Mugu were
very receptive and interested in cooperating with thesis
research involving PMTC. After the initial trip, it was
decided to concentrate on analyzing the T&E facility/Project
Manager relationship. Additional trips made to Point Mugu
focused on understanding the activity's involvement in the
T&E process.
The next five chapters represent the results of this
research with the first four chapters concentrating each on
a separate aspect of the relationship. First, the formal
weapon system acquisition process (principly the T&E
aspects) as prescribed by current directives is presented
for purposes of providing an overview of how the process
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should work. Next, a T&E activity's (PMTC) organizational
development is described together with how the organization
interacts with its external environment. Presupposing that
"he who has the gold rules", the financial management of the
facility is investigated. This is followed by a different
viewpoint of the relationship: the Project Manager's
perception of his participation in the T&E process. The
Project Manager's opinions were ascertained by means of a
questionnaire. Results of the questionnaire provide the
data for Chapter VI. This chapter proposes an objective
method of selecting the appropriate T&E facility for a




II. T.EST AND EVALUATION WITHIN THE NAVY
A. • ORGANIZATION FOR RDT&E
Reference 1 provides a general overview of the Navy
RDT&E organization and process. Much of the' following
information has been extracted from it in order to briefly
acquaint the reader with pertinent background information.
In the National Security Act of 1947 Congress tasked
the Secretary of Defense to :
"...eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department
of Defense and particularly in the field of research and
engineering. . .
"
Later, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958
established the Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) as the highest ranking assistant secretary of
defense. The primary responsibilities of DDR&E are to act as
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on
scientific and technical matters, supervise research and
engineering, and direct and control research and engineering
activities. To fulfill his responsibilities he has been
delegated authority to approve, modify, or disapprove
programs and projects of the Military Departments. DODDTR
5100.1 (Ref. 2) established the Deputy Director (Research and
Advanced Technology) (R&AT) and the Deputy Director (Test and
Evaluation) (DDT&E) as advisors to the Director.
In addition to the above DOD organization, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has the responsibility of advising
SECDEF on matters of strategic guidance, overall military
requirements, and recommendations of new weapon systems.
16

Figure 1 depicts the Department of the Navy
Organization for RDT&E. While the overall responsibility for
policies and control of the - Department of the Navy rests
with the Secretary of the Navy. Matters related to research,
development, engineering, test and evaluation are the
specific responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (R&D) (ASN (R&D) ) as directed by SECN&VINST 5430.67 (Ref.
3) . He and his small staff act as the principal contact for
DDR&E and manage the "Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation, Navy" appropriations account. Due to his limited
staff size he is dependent on advisors such as Director
RDT&E (OP-098) , the Chief of Naval Development (CND) , Chief
of Naval Research (CNR) , and the Mrector of Navy
Laboratories (DNL)
.
The Office of the Chief of Na»al Operations is
primarily concerned with defining potentially attainable
capabilities, appraising the military worth of RDT&E
advancements, and approving projects which promise the
greatest return on invested resources. These policies are
specifically implemented by DRDT&E (OP-098) who acts as the
focal point for T&E policy.
The "how" aspects of Navy RDT&E have been delegated to
the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) . His responsibilities
include:
1- Translating operational requirements into
hardware systems and technology objectives.
2. Managing the technology base.
3. Defining science and technology capabilities.
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5, Overseeing implementation of RDTSE programs.
i
CNM is assisted in the implementation of the above by
the Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Development) (DCNM (D)
)
who also acts as Chief of Naval Development (CND) and
reports directly to ASN (R&D)
.
The Naval Material Command consists of NAVMAT
designated Project Managers (PMs) plus the various Systems
Commands as depicted in Figure 2. NAVMAT designated PMs are
utilized for projects with critical interfaces between
Military Services and/or Systems Commands. For other
projects, one of the Systems Commands is placed in charge
and Projects Managers are designated within it.
NAVAIRINST 5451.80 (Ref. 4) established the Project
Management Office (AIR) within NAVAIR Headquarters to assist
in the planning, directing, and controlling general
management aspects of specific weapons system projects. As
such, they are responsible for maintaining the NAVAIR
designated project charters (5430 instruction series)
,
communicating broad policy guidance to PMs from higher
authority, and providing other assistance to PMs as
required.
The project management organization is structured by
purpose and thus cuts across various functional organization
lines. PMs are generally Navy Captains or Flag Officers
available for at least a three year tour. OPNAVINST 3960.8
(Ref. 5) charges the PM with the responsibility for
coordination and execution of a T&E program responsive to
the policies expressed in SECNAVINST 5000. 1 (Ref. 6)
.
Specifically, he must coordinate a test program with the CNO
development coordinator suitable to answer operational
questions, prepare a Test, and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP),
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appropriate laboratories, contractor facilities or T&E
activities, and determine the need for assistance of
operating forces.
Laboratories responsible for R&D of aircraft and
missile systems report directly to the Director of
Laboratory Programs (DLP) in the staff of DCNK (D) . The DLP,
also acting as DNL, is the principal advisor to ASN(R&D) in
matters of the RDT&E field complex.
Test and Evaluation of aircraft and aircraft weapon
systems is generally divided into Operational Test &
Evaluation (OT&E) and Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E)
.
OT&E is the responsibility of the VX squadrons of the
Operational Test and Evaluation Forces (OPTEVFOPv) which
report to CNO via OP-983, the Test and Evaluation Division
of OP-098. DT&E is generally under the cognizance of field
activities such as the Naval Air Test Center and Pacific
Missile Test Center which report to NAVAIR. The coordination
of T&E activity within NAVAIR is currently delegated to the
Test and Evaluation Coordinator (TECO) who is double-hatted
as CO NATC as directed by NAVAIRINST 5400. 27B (Ref . 7)
.
Some of the specific tasks of TECO are: provide to
NAVAIR recommendations and proposed directives concerning
T&E policy, act as focal point for T&E matters, assist in
preparation of and evaluate planning documents containing
T&E requirements, provide- comments to NAVAIR on adequacy of
T&E plans, review and evaluate workload assignment to field
activities, monitor actual T&E accomplishment in order to
recommend readjustment of available resources, provide
planning information to field activities, and assist NAVAIR
PMs in the coordination with COMOPTEVFOR.
NAVAIR NOTICE 5400 of 18 March, 1975 (Ref. 8)
established the Assistant Commander for Test Evaluation
21

(AIR-06) and called for an AIR-06 operational status by 1
July 1975. Ke is responsible for the policy direction,
planning, management and support of NAVAIRSYSCOM T&E
programs, facilities, ranges, and targets. He is the primary
NAVMAT contact with contractors and other government
agencies for matters concerning T&E facilities, ranges, and
targets including all Navy elements of the Department of
Defense Major Ranges and Test Facilities Base. Specific
duties include; assisting Project Managers in preparing for
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) reviews
and in budget preparation, providing life-cycle management
of targets and T&E support systems, providing guidelines for
and approving mission functions, organization and staffing
of T&E field activities and ranges, establishing the policy
for the assignment of workload to the T&E field activities,
establishing priorities for the use of T&E activities, and
maintaining liaison with COMOPTEVFOR to assure a coordinated
DT&E and OT&E of NAVAIR weapon systems and equipment. The
presently anticipated organization within AIR-06 calls for
an AIR-06T (double-hatted as CO NATC) who would be
responsible for T&E efforts and AIR-06R (double-hatted as CO
PMTC) who would be responsible for all ranges and targets.
B. PLANNING PROCESS
The planning system leading to OPN AV-supported RDT&E,
weapon systems has recently been revised from the old system
in effect since 1961. This paper will address the new
system; however, projects approved under the old system are
still in development and remain under the documents produced
by that system.
Figure 3 depicts the documentation and review procedure
utilized throughout the planning phases of a project.
















FIGURE 3. DOCUMENTATION AND REVIEW PROCEDURE
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Concepts (ASC) , are contained in the Navy Advanced Concepts
(NAC) . Up to 30 proposals may be submitted by each Systems
Command and essentially bridge the gap between science and
technology and a budgeted project. The Director of RDTSE
within the Navy selects a number of these during the Navy
budgeting cycle (POM Process) for initiation of Advanced
Development.
Concise statements of operational needs for 0- 10 years
are reflected in Operational Requirements (OR) . These three
page requests for proposal from CNM are originated within
OPNAV at the request of Fleet activities or other commands.
After technical studies, CNM replies to OPNAV with
alternative solutions contained in Development Proposals
(DPs). OPNAVINST 5000.42 (Ref. 9) suggests that an
iterative process should be developed between the OPNAV OR
sponsor and the CNM to prepare the DP and resolve all
relevant questions.
In response to the DP/ OPNAV prepares a Navy
Development Concept Paper (NDCP) for approval by the
Acquisition Review Committee (ARC) , a sub-committee of the
CNO Executive 3oard (CE3) . The NDCP represents the first
commitment of OPNAV RDTSE resources. It includes issues,
objectives, plans, parameters, areas of risk, and
development alternatives, and provides the basis for a
Development Concept Paper (DCP) . The DCP, as stated in
OPNAVINST 3930.83 (Ref. 10) is the basic source of advance
evaluation planning information.
Although the DCP and DSARC process is utilized only for
major programs, similar processes are used for minor
programs. A major program is one having an estimated RDTSE
cost in excess of $50 million, an estimated production cost
greater than $200 million, or othenwise designated by
24

SECDEF. Most DCPs cover the decision the Secretary of
Defense is being asked to make, the alternatives, the
program justification, the program management plan,
projected costs, risks, and the limits of the grant of
authority from SECDEF (thresholds) . The DCP is limited to 20
pages and is essentially a contract between SECDEF and the
Navy. Programs designated by the Deputy Director of Research
& Engineering or other appropriate principal of DSARC are
similarly documented by Program Memorandum (PM) . Each is
developed through interaction of DDR&E, CNO, CNM and the
Principal Developing Activity (PDA) , which is a field
installation.
The life cycle of a weapons system, as defined by
DODDIR 5000.1 (Ref. 2) consists of 5 phases. They are:
Conception, Validation, Full Scale Development, Production,
and Deployment.
The Conception Phase, conducted at the discretion of
the Department of the Navy, establishes a technological,
military, and economic base for the program through analysis
and experimentation. It culminates with the approval of an
Advanced Systems Concept.
The Validation Phase, often identified with advanced
development, consists of hardware development and extensive
analysis of the concepts of Phase I. Ideally, it ends with
a successful demonstration of a "brass board" model.
In the Full Scale Development Phase the weapon system
and all support items are designed, fabricated, and tested.
It includes TSE both on the part of the contractor and the
Navy.
During the Production Phase, the weapon and all support
itens and spares are produced for operational use.
25

Th-e final phase, Deployment, consists of providing the
weapon system to operational units and its subsequent use by
them.
In view of the above life cycle, the DCPs are aimed at
major milestone decisions between phases. The first
decision, DSARC I, comes after the Conceptualization Phase
and is essentially a program initiation decision. DSARC IIA,
initiation of Full Scale Development, confirms that the need
for the system is current and that development risks have
been identified and provided with solutions. The production
decision may be either for a limited (pilot) production
(DSARC IIB) or full scale production (DSARC III) . The major
elements of this decision are: the need is still current, a
practical engineering design has been achieved, technical
uncertainties are resolved, TSE has determined operational
suitability, and the remainder of the program is realistic.
DSARC membership includes DDR&E, the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense for Installations and Logistics and
Comptroller, and the Director of Defense Program Analysis
and Evaluation (DDPA&E) . The Deputy Secretary of Defense and
other ASDs may be included as required.
The DCP eventually forms the basis for the Project
Manager's overall supervision of a specific project. The
Test and Evaluation Easter Plan must be carefully
constructed to ensure that all key issues in the DCP are
addressed and all questions are answered. Thus the DCP
becomes an important document in determining where and how
the TSE for the project will be conducted.
NAVMATINST 3960.6 (Ref. 11) states that the TEMP should
be considered as a planning document rather than a control
document. It contains objectives, issues, responsibilities,
interfaces, and schedules. It attempts to identify test
26

activities and facilities intended to be used and tasks the
PM with ensuring all necessary liaison and coordination with
the test ranges and activities is accomplished to facilitate
advance planning. The instruction requires the TEMP to be
distributed to the CNO Program Coordinator (or OPNAV
sponsor), OP-983, COMOPTEVFOR, CNM (MAT 03L , 030, 033 , 04H,0UT)
,
* and participating Systems Commands and field activities. The
provisions of this instruction apply to all major projects.
NAVAIRINST 3960.2 (Ref. 12) places the requirement for
a TEMP on Less-Than-Ma jor (LTM) Projects (less than $50
million RDT&E, less than $200 million production costs) and
Lower-Range-Less-Than-Ma jor (LRLTM) Projects (less than S5
million RDT&E, less than $20 million production costs) . A
simplified format is provided for LRLTM Projects.
Within NAVAIR, NAVAIRINST 5000. UA (Ref. 13) established
an integrated NAVAIR Naval Aviation Plan (NNAP) for current,
mid-range, and long-range planning within estimated fiscal
constraints. The NNAP is designed to identify worthwhile new
ideas early through a forecast of the state-of-the-art in
critical sciences and identification of operational
requirements. Specifically, it integrates aircraft, weapons
and carrier planning data into a long range plan for
aircraft and weapon development, procurement, and support.
Additionally, it identifies critical advanced development,
and provides the Navy with long range logistic and facility
requirements. The inherent security classification of the
NNAF renders it relatively ineffectual for use at the
facility.
The Project Master Plan (PMP) , developed by the Project
Manager/Acquisition Manager, depicts the integration of all
aspects of weapon system acquisition such as ILS (integrated
logistic support), R&D, Di'&E, OT&E, procurement and funding.
27

An AIRTASK is utilized within NAVAI3 for assigning work
to field activities. NAVAIRINST 3900.8 (Ref. 14) states that
an AIRTASK is the document for translating the budget task
into work assignments to be performed ny a field activity.
When feasible, it includes all necessary technical details
to enable field activities to accomplish the work in
accordance with NAVAZR requirements. A WORK UNIT ASSIGNMENT
is a detailed assignment to a field activity for performance
of a specific task within the scope of a previously assigned
AIRTASK.
At the CSD level, in addition to the DCP/DSARC process,
other types of R&D coordinating papers exist. They are: the
Technology Coordinating Papers (TCP) which • highlights
service gaps, overlaps and needs in a given technological
area. Area Coordinating Papers (ACP) which are similar to
TCPs only cover warfare specialty areas, and Mission
Coordinating Papers (MCP) which are an expansion on ACPs and
analyze threat, needed technology, force implications,
resource impact, and future options.
C. TEST AND EVALUATION
The major objective of TSE is to provide the best
information available on the military utility of a
prospective system, its operational effectiveness and
operational suitability, needs for further development or
modification, and data useful in estimating the probaDle
cost of development completion, acquisition and ownership.
Basic policy, as stated in Reference 1, dictates
evaluation by an independent organization so far as possible
and evaluation of operational suitability prior to
production. Both of these policies are primarily
accomplished through the conductance of I0T&E by OPTEVFOR
28

and the conductance of acceptance trials by the Board of
Inspection and Survey (BIS) . These two groups report to the
CNO for these functions. OPNAVINST 3960.8 (Ref. 5)
recognizes the similarity of these 2 functions and calls for
close coordination to prevent unnecessary duplication.
The mission of the Board of Inspection and Survey is,
as stated in OPNAVINST 5420.70:
"... to inspect new model aircraft for
construction and suitability for the purpose
intended and to make recommendations on their
acceptance by the Navy ".
The Sub-Board of Inspection and Survey at Patdxent
River is assigned the responsibility of conducting trials of
aircraft to determine if the aircraft has been constructed
in accordance with contract specifications. All materiel,
performance and design defects and deficiencies found are
reported by the Board along with recommended design changes.
T&E is integrated throughout the acquisition cycle and
is not merely a follow-up to R&D. OSD classifies RDTSE into
two categories: Development Test and Evaluation and
Operational Test and Evaluation.
DODDIR 5000.3 defines DT&E as:
"...test and evaluation conducted to:demonstrate
that the engineering design and development
process is complete; demonstrate that the design
risks have been minimized; demonstrate that the
system will meet specifications; and estimate the
system's military utility when introduced."
DT&E includes Engineering Development and Design
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Support Tests, Developing Agency (DA) Tests performed by
OPTEVFOR, Contractor Demonstration, and Technical Evaluation
(TECHEVAL). Included within the TECHEVAL is the Navy
Preliminary Evaluation (NPE) , an early assessment of mission
potential prior to extensive tests, and the Navy Technical
Evaluation (NTE) , a test designed to determine a system 1 s
acceptability for fleet use. A TECHEVAL, as stated in
OPNAVINST 3930. 8B, is assigned by CNO in response to a
favorable program full-scale development decision by the
SECDEF or comparable CNO/CNH decision approving the
commitment of resources for full-scale development.
Additionally, a TECHEVAL may be requested by a Developing
Activity to determine suitability for other acquisition
programs and improvements such as conversions and
modernizations.
NAVHATIIIST 3960.6 (Ref. 11) states that OPTEVFOR
participation in DT&E is necessary to insure that meaningful
and realistic tests from the fleet operational viewpoint are
included in order to permit an early assessment of
operational suitability.
OTSE is defined as:
"...that test and evaluation conducted to estimate
the prospective system's military utility,
operational effectiveness, and operational
suitability (including compatibility,
interoperability, reliability, maintainability and
logistic and training requirements) , and need for
any modifications. In addition, OTSE provides
information on organization, personnel
requirements, doctrine, and tactics. 11
An important subcategory of OT&E is Initial Operational
Test and Evaluation (IOTSS) which according to DOD directive
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must be accomplished prior to the first major production
decision. IOTSE is conducted through an Operational
Evaluation (OPEVAL) , which is assigned by CNO at the tirce
the TECHEVAL is assigned. The objectives of OPEVAL are to
detetmine that the system meets program objectives under
operational conditions, can be effectively operated and
maintained by fleet personnel, logistic support is feasible,
and all performance and suitability questions are adequately
examined.
OPNAVINST 3930. 8B (Ref. 10) defines the various
priorities which will be assigned to projects by CNO. They
are: AA-critical to the Navy's readiness for war, A-projects
of an urgent nature bearing significantly on the Navy's
readiness for war, and B-projects that are to be started and
completed as soon as higher priority operations permit.
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III. £OINT MUG IPS ROLE IN TE.ST AND EVALUATION
This chapter follows the organizational development of
a TSE activity, namely, the Pacific Missile Test Center,
Point Mugu. Many of the organizational problems experienced
at the Point Mugu complex are similar to those at other TSE
activities, since they are all operating under the same
environmental influences. A brief historical background of
Point Mugu's past activities is presented. This is followed
by a more detailed description of events that occurred
during the past few years. Some of the problems affecting
Point Mugu's operational effectiveness are discussed
together with a description of the new reorganization,
recently instituted at Point Mugu.
This chapter provides an appreciation for the
difficulties encountered in managing the operations of a TSS
installation and, hopefully, will provide a better
perspective of the T&E evolution from the activities'
viewpoint. it must be emphasized that many of the
criticisms and problems mentioned are strictly the opinions
of the authors. These opinions were derived from personal
interviews conducted during trips made to the Point Mugu
complex.
A. BACKGROUND
The Navy's post World War II interest in Point Mugu
began in 1945 when a jroup of Navy engineers and technicians
was located there to establish a Navy weapons development
and test capability. shortly thereafter, the Naval Missile
Test Center (NAMTC) was established to carry out the Navy's
weapons test requirements. in 1958, with growing emphasis
on space programs, the range organizations of NAMTC were
reorganized into the Pacific Missile Range and designated
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one of the six National Ranges under the administration of
Deputy Director, Test and Evaluation, DoD, with the Navy
designated as its flange Management Agency (RMA) , responsible
for management and operation. Under the National Range
concept, all DoD and other federal agencies obtained common
ranga support services free, with the exceptions of services
performed outside the normal working day or services that
reguired extraordinary data reproduction (Ref. 15) . The
remainder of the NAMTC organization was consolidated into
the Naval Missile Center, as a separate field activity of
the then Bureau of Aeronautics. Both NMC and PMR were
separate activities hosted aboard the Naval Air Station, pt.
Mugu, which was a subordinate command of the PMR. NMC
maintained its role in weapons test functions utilizing the
range services of the PMR which played an important role in
satellite and space vehicle programs of the SO's.
As funding for the space program peaked out and with
growing public concern over the the Vietnam conflict,
emphasis at the PMR again shifted to weapons. NMC became the
primary user of range services at PMR as test and evaluation
took a significant role in weapons development. in 1970,
NMC was designated as a subordinate command under the
Commander of PMR (Ref. 16). PMR's command authority was only
perfuncory as NMC struggled to maintain its identity as a
separate coamand. In June 1974, NMC was again established
as an echelon 4 activity (subordinate to Systems Commands)
,
reporting directly to NAVAIRSYSCOM and hence bypassing
COMPMR in the chain of command. NMC's separate command
identity was shortlived, however, as COMPMR successfully
convinced NAVAIRSYSCOM that the Pt. Mugu complex would be
more effective if the resources of NMC and PMR were
reorganized into a separate command activity, the Pacific





In 1958, with the establishment of PMR as a National
Range, NMC began to expand its capabilities as a weapons
test facility which entailed functions already available at
PHfi. By 1970, NMC was capable of providing total weapons
testing services with the exception of the range resources
needed for actual launches {i.e. launch pads and range
terrain) . The services at NMC included the planning and
conducting of engineering experiments for determining the
operational effectiveness and reliability of assigned
weapons systems as well as the laboratory investigations
concerning the development, test, and evaluation of weapon
systems. Other functions, however, not normally performed by
a weapons testing facility had also been developed. The
Aircraft Maintenance Department accomplished intermediate
level maintenance on the growing fleet of aircraft assigned
to NMC. The Photo/Graphics Department . had developed
photographic facilities which constituted one of the
best-equipped laboratories in the Navy. The Threat
Simulation Department had developed expertise in the design,
development, procurement and operation of aerial, seaborne,
land and special targets.
C. CONSOLIDATION
By 1970 PMR's space program involvement was all but
eliminated by the increasing emphasis on weapons testing.
For purposes of reducing duplicative functions of PMR and
NMC both activities were placed under one commander along
with the Naval Air Station and the PMR Facility, Hawaiian
Area (Figure 4). NMC would provide photographic and
aircraft maintenance services for tenant activities and
























































































PMR, as a prime supporter of the space program had
found little difficulty obtaining funding for range
expansion and improvement. PMR's institutional funding
flowed directly from the DoD level and resource allocation
was loosely controlled. As a member of the National Ranges,
PMR's facilities were available "free-of-charge" and,
consequently, little motivation was provided to improve
efficiency. Many observers at the Pt. Mugu complex have
described PMR as a stagnant organization. One individual
who was attached to the range organization of NAMTC back in
the 50's and had recently rejoined the organization stated "
The range is still conducting business the way it did 20
years ago." NMC, on the other hand, was receiving much of
its funding through Navy weapon systems appropriation
categories. Tighter control of resources through the Navy
chaia-of-command had a positive effect on NMC's efficiency
since NMC enjoyed a favorable reputation as a well-run,
dynamic organization. Command assignment to NMC was highly
desirable and almost an assurance for promotion. Assignment
to command of PKR was not viewed in the same light as,
traditionally, the commander of PMR was on his "twilight
tour 41 .
With the exception of eliminating a number of
duplicative functions the consolidation did little more than
to bring the Commanding Officer of NMC under the
chain-of-command of the Admiral stationed at the Point Mugu
complex.
1 • Bnyirpngental Influences
Almost concurrently with the 1970 Point Mugu
consolidation, NMC was placed under the Navy Institutional
Funding (NIF) system. NMC, as a NIF activity, would require
customers to pay for the total cost of services provided,
direct cost plus a share of the overhead. PMR, however,
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woull remain solely institutionally funded and
"free-of-charge" services would continue for range users.
NMC recognized the new funding technigue as a means of
expanding and improving existing resources. NMC aggressively
sougat increased business and actively competed with other
T&E facilities for new weapons program selections. During
the period of 197Q to 1974 NMC increased its annual business
activity from approximately $40 million to over $100
million. PUR, on the other hand, had little control over
improving its existing assets. With defense appropriations
shrinking, PMR's institutional funding leveled off at $6 1
million during the same period, as reported in its FY 74
budget forecast. Stagnation continued to be a way of
business at PMR, with no motivation for improved efficiency.
Since the consolidation, unrest and turmoil have
hampared operations aboard the Pt. Mugu complex. Lack, of
directipn from higher authority was recognized as a primary
source of discontent. Coordination of TSE activities was
nonexistent. As a result, 7SE field activities functioned
autonomously, lacking clear objectives on where to
concentrate their efforts. Fearing exclusion from new
programs, TSE activities attempted to keep their technology
base broad enough to permit inclusion in future programs.
While NMC, under its NIP funding, was able to take advantage
of the competitive environment and market its services to
potential users, the lack of TSE coordination was
detrimental to PMR. PMR's inclusion in a program had to be
determined early enough in a weapon systems' development to
provide sufficient lead time for development and
installation of the sophisticated equipment needed for the
range. Other National Ranges possessed enough functional
characteristics similiar to PMR to threaten its exclusion.
Since funding for National Ranges was through appropriations
categories originating at the DoD level, PMR personnel had
little influence ovei their own future. Frustration
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permeated throughout the PMK establishment. Personnel felt
unable to measure their effectiveness in comparison with
other range activities and, consequently, helpless in
determining future programs' range selections.
Alth6ugh the majority of projects, by dollar value,
contracted by NMC required the use of PMR facilities, there
existed a definite lack of cooperation between the two
activities. Communications flow between the two activities
was poor. Each command maintained its own contact point for
external inquiries on the progress of the same program.
Duplicative functions again grew. In one instance, both
commands were developing a data instrumentation package for
the same purpose without each other being aware of it. By
disassociating itself from PMR, NMC was able to disclaim
responsibility for inadequacies arising during the range
phases of the T&E. The reason for the rivalous
relationship, rather than a cooperative atmosphere, wasn't
clear but perhaps NEC's insistence on maintaining its
separate command identity was to blame.
D. REORGANIZATION PROPOSED
In 1972, the new Commanding Officer of PMR recognized a
need to set aside the growing unrest that was affecting the
entire organization. He cited that lack of direction from
above was hindering PMR's ability to evaluate itself. No
clear dividing line of responsibility between Washington and
field activities existed. A series of ad hoc committees were
formed to investigate the difficulties existing at the Point
Mugu complex, while the Command focused its thrust upon
stirring up action in Washington. Shortly thereafter, the
new Commanding Officer announced that he was proposing a
reorganization of Pt. Mugu. External support for the
reorganization was gained by claiming that over 300 jobs
could be eliminated through the reorganization. Internal
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pressure against the proposal mounted. Personnel production
suffered due to the uncertainty of job security. Tne
command billet at NMC, which was a popular career enhancing
billet normally held by an Aeronautical Engineering Duty
Officer (AEDO) , was also threatened by possible extinction.
Elimination of the billet was strongly opposed by the AEDO
community.
Before the reorganization obtained enough support for
implementation, another shock wave infiltrated the complex.
Early in 1973, the Shore Establishment Realignment (3ER)
,
which was successful in closing the Hunters Point Shipyard,
at the cost of over 4000 jobs, announced plans to turn the
range functions at PMR over to private contractors, thus
eliminating T400 jobs. The employee organization responded
vigorously to squelch this latest proposal which was
eventually defeated by Congress. Meanwhile, the SER
incident had dominated the scene through 1973 and, the
reorganization never became a reality. Due to the opposition
from both within and external to the organization there
existed strong doubts that, even without the SER, the
reorganization would have been accomplished.
E. LATEST EVENTS
By 1974, it became increasingly obvious to the
Washington based Navy hierachy that the consolidation of PMR
in 1970 had accomplished very little towards increasing the
complex's effectiveness. With the exception of eliminating
some duplicative functions, the two primary activities at
Point Mugu had suffered considerable internal strife. The
arrival of a new Commanding Officer at Point Mugu, in June
of 1974, was overshadowed by two significant events: 1) NMC
was no longer in the chain- of-command of: the COMPMR, but
instead, was reinstated as an echelon 4 activity, reporting
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directly to NAVAIRSY5C0M} 2) The National Ranges would now
charge users all direct costs associated with their
projects.
The reestablishment of NMC as an echelon 4 activity
reasserted the apparent, that NMC was indeed a separate
field activity. The fact that NHC's funding authorization
flowed directly from NAVAIRSYSCOM had seriously hindered
COMPMR's ability to exercise any real control over NMC's
operations. Whether or not NMC's "new found" autonomy would
have a positive effect on Point Mugu's effectiveness was
questionable.
The direct cost to customers scheme would certainly
have an effect on PHR's mode of operation. Not only would
range users be able to assess ranges on the less tangible
characteristic of service quality but, also, by the more
objective method of service cost. Whether or not PMR could
successfully respond to the new challenge of keeping costs
down was uncertain, but what was certain is that PMR was
given a motivation for efficiency and an opportunity to
evaluate itself relative to other ranges. The stagnancy
that degraded PMR's effectiveness in the past wasn't
tolerable under the new funding method, which would instill
a competitive operating mode among the various ranges for
the TSE dollar. Not only would cost efficient operations
mean more ousiness activity for PMR, but also would weigh
significantly in the amount of institutional funding flowing
from DoD for expansion and improvement of facilities.
General Starbird, DD(TkE), DoD, has closely monitored the
allocation of institutional funding for the various T&E
activities and has been a strong advocate for efficiency
measurements of TSE facilities. He has made his opinion
quite clear; the cost efficient facilities will receive the
dollars. PMR personnel have recognized the impact of the
funding change and have initiated efforts to include
40

marketing in their mode of operation.
No sooner had the events of June 1974 been absorbed
when the new COMPMR released startling news. He felt the
present organization wasn't responsive to the Navy's T&E
needs and that, consequently, a reorganization would be
studied. "the changes proposed by the Admiral were radical
and would totally eliminate NMC's identity. To appease
opposition from the AEDO community, he proposed that an AEDO
would hold the second highest billet, vice commander, and he
would have responsibilities commensurate with the NMC
command position. Internal resistance never surfaced, as
with the previous reorganization proposal, since no jobs
were proposed for elimination. Washington's support was
achieved by selling the benefits of a reorganized Point Mugu
complex and avoiding any inferences to inadequacies existing
at upper echelon operating levels. The new organization was
to be named the Naval Weapons Test Center (NWTC) thus
avoiding any inference to the PMR. The reorganization gained
acceptance. However, just prior to finalization General
Starbird, a strong opponent of service parochialism,
objected to the use of Naval in the title. Navy officials
acquiesced, and on April 25, 1975, the Pacific Missile Test
Center (PMTC) was established.
The 1970-1974 timeframe at Point Mugu was not a
productive period in terms of efficiency. Internal
managerial problems and lack of external guidance are
identified as primary reasons. The PMTC organization is an
attempt to solve many of the internal problems and is
structured to be more responsive to external activities.
F. PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER
Specific documents addressing the need for
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reorganization of the Point Mugu complex were not available
for general dissemination. However, several studies in
recent
,
years have identified the need for improved
organizational effectiveness of T&E facilities in general
(Refs. 17, 18, and 19). The data justifying a
reorganization is limited to personal interviews of
personnel at Point Mugu and the subjective conclusions
stemming from these interviews.
1. Weed For Reorganization
The following is a list of specific problems
recently identified as affecting the overall effectiveness
of the Point Mugu complex which, unless otherwise noted,
refer to the range organization.
a. Lack of Technical Advice
The mode of operations on the range has been
technically passive. The user requested a certain service
and received whatever the range was capable of providing.
The technical competence exists at the range to advise the
user of what he needs rather than what he wants. Range
personnel, familiar with its limitations, could most
adequately accomodate a user's requirements by tailoring
need to match the range's capabilities.
b. Lack of Cooperation
Both the range and the missile center have the
same basic mission of supporting TS2. As such, both must
operate on a cooperative basis for without one there would
hardly be a need for the other. However, as the previous
development has shown, this was not the case.
c. Unclear External Perception
To the user who was having T&E performed at
Point Mugu there was little distinction between the ranje
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and the missile center. When a question arose that needed
to be answered immediately, he frustratedly discovered that
he would have to make a distinction between which activity
to direct his inquiry since both activities maintained
separate contact points on projects and made little attempt
to communicate with each other.-
d. Staff Duplication
This challenges the need for duplicative staffs
at two activities, located at the same geographical point,
whose functions are complementary.
e. Long Range Planning Conflicts
It is hard to believe that activities at this
level can justifiably plan for their future involvement in
particular weapon systems when that deterrainat ioion is
dependent entirely on decisions made at higher echelons.
However, lack of guidance from higher authority has forced
PMR & NMC to plan their future involvements. Unfortunately,
both activities do this independently, failing to recognize
their own vested interest.
f. Personnel Stagnation
A common complaint in any organization with
tenure status is the problem of how to deal with tenured
personnel who cease to contribute useful benefit to the
organization. Key managerial positions have been filled by
the same people for many years who have resisted changes to
their mode of operation. One person stated "When a RTF
(Reduction in Force) occurs, the best people must go and
we're left with the deadwood. The only thing wa can do is
try and build the organization around them."
g. Empire Building
Personnel stagnation has also fostered "empire
building" with separate units within the organization
4 3

functioning almost independent of the Command. One
department promulgated its own five year plan while the
s-taff prepared one for the department also.
h. Improper procedural Implementation
Changes were generated at the Command level and
presented to the executive board for dissemination.
Functional managers did not participate in policy
implementation. Ideas flowed strictly down the
chain-of-command without a feedback mechanism.
i. Inadeguate Reports
The management information system generated data
inadeguate for managers to make decisions. Reports were
structured in financial terms only, suitable for a financial
analyst's interpretation. As a consequence, the comptroller
was involved in making decisions which should be made by
functional managers. The comptroller should have only been
responsible for the operation of set policy and not engaged
in planning decisions.
j. Inappropriate Involvement
NMC, through its agressiveness, has inherited
some responsibilities not involved with their primary
mission. At times, prooiems in these areas have tended to
bog down the Command's effectiveness. The Threat Simulation
Department, which was responsible for target development
belonged under the cognizance of the range activity.
Aircraft maintenance is normally the responsibility of a
Naval Air Station and not of a T&E activity.
2- Corporate Characteristics
The PMTC organization, recently established at Point
Mugu, was a radical change from the previous organization.
Many of the new innovations incorporated were developed
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following a comprehensive presentation from the Vice
President of Management Systems at the TRW Corporation. The
dynamic characteristics of TRW, which were considered
necessary to remain competitive in the rapidly changing
technological environment, were also considered suitable for
PMTC's interface with the T&E environment. By instituting a
TRW-like organization, PMTC would be acquiring both the
strengths and weaknesses of TRW's organization.
The matrix project mangement method of TRW (Ref.
20) assigned project managers from the functional
departments of the organization to manage the company's
total life involvement in a project. Upon completion, the
project manager returned to a functional assignment. This
had proved to be beneficial, in that project managers were
kept abreast of the latest technology and personnel
stagnation was avoided in project management positions. On
the other hand, selection to a project management position
was temporary and, once the project was completed, there was
no assurance that his old position would still be available.
Consequently, qualified personnel would sometimes shun the
opportunity for visibility as a project manager.
The matrix project mangement method also provided
for efficient allocation of personnel. More flexibilty
existed to shuttle personnel to work on other projects when
not needed on a particular one and, consequently, eliminated
a large amount of idle manpower. This benefit was traded
off with the increased cost coliecrion problem of
identifying the costs associated with a particular project.
Personnel could be working on more than one project during
the the same period and the problem of cost identification
increased. One of the reasons for successful project
completions has been the personal integrity of the personnel
which motivated them to work extra hours to get the job
done. To what degree personnel at PMTC will be motivated




The resources of the Naval Missile Center and the
Pacific Missile Range were combined into the Pacific Missile
Test Center whose mission is (Hef. 21):
"To perform development test and evaluation,
development support, and follow-on engineering,
logistic, and training support for Naval weapons,
weapons systems, and related devices; and to
provide Major Range, technical, and base support
for Fleet users and other Department of Defense
and government agencies. 11
PMTC is comprised of seven directorates and two
management groups (Figure 5) . Of the seven directorates,
three are directly involved with the functional aspects of
current T&E projects and another, the Fleet Weapons
Engineering Directorate, follows the life cycle of a weapon
system after it has completed development at PMTC and is
introduced to the Fleet. Two other directorates, PMRF
Hawaii, and the Marine Air Detachment, have functions not
directly affected by the reorganization. A brief discussion
of the other directorates and the two groups follows.
a. Naval Air Station
An institutionally funded directorate whose main
function of operating and maintaining base facilities and
provide base support services for the PMTC and ^assigned
tenant activities will remain relatively intact. In
addition, NAS assumed responsibilit j for aircraft
maintenance, formerly performed by NMC The Surface Craft
Department, whose function was to operate, maintain, and
provide surface craft in support of range operations, range












































































































An institutionally funded directorate with a
strictly operationally oriented function that provides
assigned Major Range services, related range facilities, and
target systems for PMTC projects, including development of
range systems, subsystems, and technigues. The heart of the
PMR, the Range Directorate charges users direct costs for
services rendered. Released from all non-operational
functions, the directorate assumed responsibility for the
Surface Craft Department's functions of NAS and the Threat
Simulation Department's functions of NMC.
c. Fleet Support Directorate
Formerly the Fleet Weapons Engineering
Department of NMC, this directorate's function remained
intact. The directorate provides the single entry point for
all PMTC in-service engineering projects after completion of
test and evaluation phases.
d. Systems Evaluation Directorate
A NIF funded directorate, the directorate
provides the technical expertise needed to appraise a
customer's T6E requirements. Comprising many of the
functions of NMC's Laboratory Department, the directorate
performs development test and evaluation, development
suppDrt, test and evaluation support to in-service
engineering cf Naval weapons, weapons systems and related
devices, including development of test and evaluation
technologies and methodologies.
e. Engineering Applications Directorate
A NIF funded directorate, the directorate
assumed responsibility for the functions of the Data
Analysis and Processing Department of PMR, some of the
functions of the Data Analysis and Processing Department of
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PMR, and some of NMC's Laboratory Departments functions.
Throagh its department, the directorate supports the
protDtype design and fabrication needed for PMTC projects as
well as photographic and instrumentation requirements.
f. Project Management Group
Through this group, the project management
matrix technique is enacted. The group represents the
single entry point for PMTC projects providing project
management, coordination, and information for PMTC projects..
For adequate customer responsiveness, the group has mirrored
the structure of the NAVAIRSYSCOM Project Managers 1 offices,
a major source of PMTC projects. Similar to the autonomy
enjoyed by NAVAIR Project Managers, Project Officers work
directly for the Commander PMTC, while obtaining
administrative support from the PMG. By operating in the
classical matrix mode, the Project Officer crosses
horizontally through functional lines in the organization to
ensure proper project development. The Project Officer is
not supposed to infiltrate vertically through the
organization by involving himself in the day-to-day tasks
which are the responsibility of functional task managers.
His primary concerns are time and cost. Project priority is
set by the Director of the PMG and thus avoids conflicts
between Project Officers and functional managers over
priorities, traditionally a source of conflict.
g. Resources Management Group
This group provides a unigue aspect to the PMTC
organization in that it provides a new approach to resources
management. The group's function is to provide policy
guidance, advice, and integrated planning and information
for the management of the PMTC financial, workforce, and
physical resources, and provide support to all PMTC
management levels. By it^. method of operation, the group
encourages participative involvement throughout the
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organization by acting as a focal point for both policy
planning/implementation and resource allocation. The RMG
could best be described as a matrix organization in reverse,
distinguishing itself from the normal matrix/staff
organization. An example would best serve to point out the
differentiation:
Under a matrix/staff organization a department
head, citing a need for a financial analyst in his
department, would set about to hire a financial
analyst. After finding someone that appears
suitable for the position, using his limited
knowledge of finances as a criterion, he hires the
person. The newly hired person works for the
department and is evaluated based on the department
head's appraisal of his work. The comptroller, in a
staff position, has no direct control over the
analyst's performance and exercises minor control
through the department head.
Under PMTC's organization, the head of the P.KG's
Comptroller/Financial Mangement Department cites a
need for a financial analyst in a department. All
the financial analysts work directly for him and,
consequently, he is able to sr.ift them wherever he
deems appropriate. Quite often, another department
may have an overallowance and,- an analyst can be
shifted to the department needing him, thus
precluding the hiring of an additional analyst. The
analyst works directly for the comptroller,
providing financial services to the department.
The centralization of resources has great advantages
in resource allocation. If a directorate cites a need for
additional office space, the property Management Division of
the RMG can objectively evaluate the request and determine
the most efficient allocation of additional office space,
considering the overall benefit to PMTC. Through the Work
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Force Management Division, personnel talent can be most
effectively distributed throughout the organization. It
provides a vehicle for moving people between directorates to
develop competent Project Officers. The dynamics of
personnel movement, used by the division, can also be used
to eliminate the problem of personnel stagnation.
The centralization of resource allocation may have
taken some control away from the directorate heads but the
advantages of centralization appear to outweigh this
drawback. Looking froni another viewpoint, the directorate
heads no longer need concern themselves over proper resource
allocation and can direct their energies to the prime
objectives of their directorate. Within each directorate
there is a resources office which is responsible for the
financial functions and which also has personnel reporting
to the RMG on matters of planning, property mangement,
management systems, and work force management. The planning
aspect of the RMG provides an excellent vehicle for two-way
communications and policy/change implementation. The
directorates, through the RMG, state the need for a policy
change to the Executive Board, comprising the heads of all
the directorates and the COMPMTC. The Board reviews 'the
proposals recommended by the RUG and makes the decision.
The RMG then disseminates the policy guidance and manages
its implementation. Through the RMG, the Command hopes to
attain participative management throughout all levels of the
organization.
G. FINDINGS
Many of the problems afflicting Point Mugu have been
eliminated by virtue of the reorganization which eliminated
separate command identities. Still present are the people
who were involved in and caused many or the problems thit
plagued the complex for so many years. The new organization

provides a better means for the Command to react to the
changing external environment. Internally, the organization
possesses the dynamic capability to adequately assign its
resources and obtain their most beneficial contribution,.
What remains to be seen is if the personnel will provide the
cooperation and the flexibility the nev organization
demands. Only through personnel motivation can the problems
of technical advise and lack of cooperation be eradicated.
The external perception of PMTC can best be improved by
customer satisfaction, again, a function of personnel. The
problem of inadequate reports is still being addressed. A
centralized, highly elaborate Management Information System
(MIS) is proposed that will provide the proper information
needed at each level of management to put the decisions back
in the hands of the functional managers. Inappropriate
involvement has been reduced by attempting to identify the
most suitable directorate for functions and by eliminating
those functions which serve no useful purpose in PMTC's
mission. The EMG provides an adequate, policy implementation
and feedback mechanism, enhancing the principles of
participative management. Additionally, the RMG has a
rather effective method of eliminating personnel stagnation
by moving personnel out of key positions under the guise of
personal development.
Other T&E activities are also recognizing their
organizational inadequacies and are presently revampin
;
their organizations for more efficient operations. NATC has
also just undergone a similar type of reorganization. Yet
to be resolved are the inadequacies of upper echelon
direction and coordination. A separate command at
NAVAIRSYSCOM is being established to bring the TSE effort
under a unified command. The COMPMTC is now proposed to
"double hat" as AIR 0-6R in charge of Ranges S Targets,
while COMNATC is to "double hat" as AIR 0-6T, in charge of
Test and Evaluation. This will put COMPMTC in charge of
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some of NATC's resources and vice versa. This might lead to
some problems but the final details have not been worked
yet. In any event, the Navy organization is finally





In this chapter the reader is introduced to both the
Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) and the Resource Management
System (RMS) managerial concepts. The Navy's RDT&E
facilities are normally funded and financially managed by
one of the two methods, either under NIF or by institutional
dollars under RMS. An examination of PMTC is then done in
order to acquaint the reader with the financial environment
existing at a T&E installation.
PMTC is presently operating under both financial
methods, NIF and RMS. This dual fiscal mode for PMTC
resulted from the recent merger of the Pacific Missile
Range, operating under institutionally funded RMS, and the
Navy Missile Center, a NIF activity. Continuation of the
existing two financial methods is assured until FY-77 when
PMTC will, become a modified NIF organization.
A. NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
Navy Industrial Funding is an accounting device that
introduces into the aanageraent of government industrial and
commercial type activities an integrated system of
accounting according to coaimerical concepts including the
utilization of a working capital account. Creation in 1949
of an industrial fund, NIF, within the Navy Department was
pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary of
Defense under the National Security Act Amendment of 1949
for establishment of working capital funds in the DoD.
The needs for working capital funds such as NIF
developed from Congressional investigation into the
industrial facilities of the Military Departments during
WWII. Studies made by the various Congressional committees
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pointed to a definite lack of adequate cost accounting and
the need for some means of accurate, yet simple, cost
determination. By permitting the existence of working
capital funds Congress constructed a financial management
tool - "making those officals fully responsible for a direct
accounting for the money they spend, the costing of each
job, and the most economical method of accomplishing the
work" (Ref. 22).
Objectives and benefits derived from a NIF managed
installation are as follows in Reference 22:
"1. To provide a more effective means for cost
control over operations and a more effective and
flexiole means for financing, budgeting and
accounting for such operations.
2. To promote a greater sense of responsibility or
cost consciousness in customers of the industrial
fund installationsi The buying agency must
actually pay for the goods and services furnished
by such installations based on the availability of
its funds.
3. To permit industrial fund activities to more
effectively discharge their responsibilities by
means of separate financing of operations and less
cumbersome budgeting and accounting methods.
4. The managers of industrial fund activities
should be motivated to operate their activity by
the most efficient means because there will be
more appropriate indicators of efficiency."
Introduction of NIF to an industrial activity such as a
shipyard, an aircraft rework facility, or a research
installation is accomplished by the formalization of a
charter and the establishment of a working capital account.
The charter represents the approval of the Secretary of
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Defense for the activity to operate under industrial fund
procedures. Additionally, the charter describes the
activities working capital requirement, volume of business,
procedures and rates to be used for cost allocation of
requested services.
A significant part of the charter is the providing of
initial working capital to the new NIF activity. It provides
the cash to cover operating expenses and the liabilities
which are assumed initially, together with provision for the
required investment in inventories of raw materials and
supplies. Working capital net amount, subtracting such items
as accounts payable for goods and services, and annual leave
of employees, is then available as a revolving fund to
finaice the cost, of goods and services produced for the
users of the activity. Reimbursement of the industrial fund
is accomplished by billing the appropriation account of the
using activity for goods or services rendered.
A buyer-seller or a contractual relationship exists
between the industrial fund activity and those organizations
requiring its products or services. Existence of a
buye::-seller relationship commences with the submission of
an order by the buyer for a specific product or services and
its acceptance by the selling activity at an agreed upon
price to be paid by the buyer. Agreed upon price is at a
standard rate established in the charter. The customer is
responsible for budgeting and budgetary control for the cost
of end-products and services ordered from a NIF activity.
Figure 6 illustrates the cycle of operations under NIF
financing.
Rate for services and products will vary among
facilities under NIF according to the installation's unique
overhead expenses, use of institutional appropriations, or























FIGURE 6. NIF FUNDING CYCLE
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data gathered on five NIF installations indicated a large
difference in actual cost passed on to the user. NATC
Patuxent River and NAPTC Trenton have a rate per hour to a
customer of $9.47 and $9.82, respectively, and a rate per
hour total cost to the facility of $27.15 for NATC and
$27.49 for NAPTC. In each case there exists a difference of
approximately $18 per hour. For NAF Indianapolis, NWC China
Lake, and NMC Point Mugu, both the rate per hour total cost
and rate charge to the customer were identical: $17.58 for
NAF, $18.74 for NWC and $18.60 for NMC (Ref. 23).
Dependence of an industrial fund activity on the
revenue it earns from its customers to replenish the working
capital plus the buyer-seller relationship are two
incentives which contribute to good management. These
elements influence an industrial activity and its users much
the same way as customers and managers in private business
are influenced by competition and the necessity for economic
procurement and control of spending. A customer is motivated
to order only that product or service for which he has a
real need, since it must be paid for out of his annual
operating allotment. The contractual relationship pressures
management of an industrial fund organization to improve
cost estimating and cost control. DoD Directive 7410.4 of
September 25, 1972 (Ref. 24) offers the reader further
information on Industrial Funds.
B. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DoD Directive 7000.1, as stated in Reference 25,
reflects a change in views within the Federal Government
concerning what constitutes good performance by
administrators. Now performance is judged by
cost-effectiveness and output. This is done through the
measurement of management's use of resources during specific
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periods by comparing actual with budgeted expenditures.
Older governmental management systems had different
objectives and were concerned only with legitimate use of
public funds. New changes in performance criteria require
corresponding changes in management and information systems.
The Navy response to the Directive was its Resource
Management System. RMS is a managerial procedure which
improves the planning, control and optimal utilization of
scarce resource (money, material and manpower) at the lowest
practical work level of an RDTSE" activity, identified as a
cost center. Participative management is encouraged within
the RDT&E facility and between the activity and its Systems
Command Headquarter. Both the cost center and activity
command management receive greater degree of responsibility
and a larger role in decision making concerning what work
they do, their budgeting request, work schedule and
progress.
Several advantages over previous management systems are
accomplished by RMS. Reporting efforts under RMS show data
on the same basis as the budget. There is a basis for
evaluating performance of personnel, equipment, material and
projects in relation to cost. A history or data base for
future planning is created. Management decisions are made
more accurate and easier by hard data (Ref. 24). The
improvements are a result of cost center activity in
planning of resources, execution of the budget, the
accounting for resources, and financial responsibility. RMS
combines the expanded managerial functions of cost centers
into a single system in which the functions interact with
each other.
For task assignments under institutional funding, RMS
encourages a more objective comparison of task output
against the resources put into the task. Institutional
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funding, sometimes called "bucket" funding, provides to an
activity through its "Approved Operating Budget" a source of
obligational authority by which to operate. The "Approved
Operating Budget" is the appropriate Systems Command
Headquarter ' s response (NAVAIR for PMTC) to the organization
forecast of services rendered on task assignments from its
sponsor. Figure 7 is a graphical depiction of the
institutional funding flow from Congress to a cost center.
An activity is not limited to performing services only
for its sponsor. It may receive work request from external
users, such as OPTEVFOR or a NIF funded organization. Work
performed on these task assignments are on a reimbursable
arrangement. Customers are charged the cost of the services
or goods produced for them, which include the direct cost
and possibly the allocated overhead.
Under RMS, all military labor, direct or indirect,
including duty is considered statistical. The label
"statistical" means military labor is not actually included
in the total costs of a cost center. It is budgeted,
however, because it is necessary to know for managerial and
statistical purposes the actual number of military hours and
dollars used, and how they are used. Statistical military
labor is often described as unfunded military labor (Ref.
25) .
The mission of the responsibility center, cost center,
and sub-cost center determines the nature of the workload to
be accomplished. In foLraulating resource planning
requirements to accomplish anticipated aorkload, work is
classified into meaningful categories of programs,
functions, objectives, etc. This entails the identification
of specific objectives, pLograms, functions, tasks, or
projects, establishment of appropriate jou order to collect




























FIGURE 7. FLOW OF INSTITUTIONAL DOLLARS
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required, and development of time schedules (fiscal
quarters) for accomplishment of effort.
At PMTC, the RMS network consists of sub-cost centers
(divisions) , cost centers (departments) , and responsibility
centers, which generally equate to directorate level
organization. The network of cost centers facilitates the
preparation of the budget, the recording of accumulated
expenditures and, most importantly, the fixing of resource
responsibility.
C. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND FUNDING PROCEDURES FOR PMTC
PMTC continues to use the fiscal procedures and
financial management which existed prior to the unification
of PUR & NMC. PMR, while under the RMS managerial concept,
received its fiscal procedures and funding guidance through
two mediums: the Major Ranges and Test Facilities Base
(MRTFB) , as specified in DODDIR 3200.11, as well as RMS, as
promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller, Navy, for
RDTSlf activities. MRTFB prescribes a uniform funding policy
that has been implemented at all 26 member activities of the
MRTF3. The uniform funding policy conceived and executed by
the Defense Department states that all direct costs of an
HBTF3 activity will be paid by the using activity or
organization, costs which are not reimbursed by the user,
such as overhead expenses, will be funded by the DoD
component who is managing the installation, i.e., the Navy
for j?MR.
A job order cost accounting system is required of
participating members by the MRTFB to support DoD uniform
funding policy. Such a job order system does exist at PMTC
for both MRTFB and NIF directorates. Once a work request is
accepted by PMTC, an operation number is assigned to it.
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Then all labor and material used on the work request is
recorded to that specified operation number. The system
simplifies the audit trail but necessitates a high degree of
data recording.
Directorates falling under HRTFB/RMS are those
comprising PMR former functions and personnel plus the
Program Management Group and the Threat Simulation
Department from NHC and the Naval Air Station organization,
including the Aircraft Maintenance Department (AMD) . AHD
was a separate department in NHC and was operated under NIF.
NIP managed directorates in PHTC number only three, with the
heart of NMC transfered to the Systems Evaluation
Directorate.
Following is a list of the directorates and their
personnel level. Prior to consolidation, PHE work force
consisted of 556 military personnel and 2422 civilians and
the NMC manpower complement was 443 military and 1,937
civilians (Ref . 26)
.
£i£££torate illfleers Enlisted £S Tota
MRTFB^RMS,
COBPHTC 3 2 105 110
Flag Admin. 7 2 35 44
Liaison Office 3 3
Range/Target Of ' i.
«
1 1
PMG 7 70 77
RMG 1 298 299
Range 38 128 1092 1258







Officers Enlist ed • GS l.Qta
2 2
20 2f£ 58 152














Total PMTC 162 846 4725 5733
MRTFB/RMS directorates receive their operating dollars
via the Naval Air Systems Command from the Navy RDTSE
appropriated institutional funds as an RMS activity. The
operating budget is examined and approved by higher
authority within DoD and Congress under the policy of
incremental programming of funds. Incremental programming
provides that only those funds reguired for a given fiscal
year are included in the authorization request. This
compels the MRTFB directorates to program the funding for
their RDT&E effort on an annual incremental basis as opposed
to the fully funded program basis of the procurement
appropriation (Ref. 27). Directorates* approved operating
budget, constituting a separate and distinct program element
within the DoD budget, is the limit of their obligational
authority as set by Congress. Under RMS, obligational
authority represents the maximum dollar value of goods and
services which may be ordered during the fiscal year.
Institutional funds make up a large part of the
operating revenues but not all of it. Approximately a fifth
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of the dollars needed for day to day operatios come from the
range's users through direct cost charges to them (Ref. 28)
This direct charge to users is a recent phenomenon
resulting from a Defense Department study commencing in
April 1972, chaired by Mr. George W. Bergguist, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Policy and
Information) , of the funding policy existing at the 26 major
ranges and test facilities including, at that time, PMR.
One conclusion reached in Mr. Bergguist's investigation
was the necessity to improve cost control and economic
efficiency among the MRTFB by charging the users the direct
cost of services or goods ordered. A direct consequence of
this study was DoD Directive 3200.11, dated June 18, 1974,
whicn spells out that "all DoD Components and other Federal
Government agencies will reimburse the major ranges and test
facilities for direct cost". All costs not identifiable to
a user are charged to institutional funds.
Appendix A projects a clear picture of: the growth of
direct cost; who the users are; and past, present, and
forecast operating budgets for PHR. Although PMR ceases to
exist, the amount of institutional funds allotted to its
range functions (directorates) will continue as part of
DDT82 financial planning- DDTSE is the final approval
authority within the Defense Department for budget requests
from any of the national ranges and test facilities as
assigned by DODDIR 3200.11.
Modernization and improvement funds for the RMS
directorates come from several appropriation accounts
including the RDT&E (N) institutional fund and Other
Procurement Navy (OPN) appropriations. The PMR side of PMIC
represents approximately a $150,000,000 investment in range
instrumentation. An average life expectancy of the major
range equipment is ten years, with instrumentation
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obsolescence occurring sooner than that. This would dictate
an annual investment of about $15,000,000 for necessary
replacement and update to maintain current state-of-the-art
range instrumentation systems. For the past ten years,
PMR's budget submissions for range modernization and
replacement have been cut in half. To make up for the
deficiencies in appropriations of needed funds and to
fulfill the projected reeds of the Navy a $153,980,000 Range
Instrumentation Procurement plan for the years FY-75 through
FY-81 was prepared (Ref . 28) . Appendix A gives a breakdown
of this plan and Reference 28 reports on the major range
asset acguistions.
The three directorates under NIF receive their
operating revenue ultimately from the user via the progress
payment method. Progress payments is the existing practice
used by NIF cost centers for collecting accrued costs
generated from: work requests, value of inventory
identified and reserved for the user's order, and amount of
work in prpgress. The customer receives a monthly bill for
these costs. Reimbursement for services or goods ordered
from the NIF cost center by a user within the Federal
Government is accomplished by cross disbursement without the
use of checks. Eliminating the needs of using checks is
done by charging the appropriate fund accounts of the user
activity and PMTC NIF fund the dollar value indicated in the
billing. Collection of costs from external customers to the
Federal Government is accomplished by checks.
Internal billing between PMTC's cost centers, both NIF
and MRTFB, requires a specific set of rules to ensure
compliance with DoD's MRTFB and Industrial Fund regulations.
MRTF3's uniform funding policy permits reimbursement of
direct cost, only, and NIF allows the collection of total
costs. Direct work performed by a NIF cost center for a RMS
customer cost center is charged on the basis of direct costs
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plus overhead. Work for another PMTC NIF cost center is
chargeable on the basis of actual costs, only, without
overhead application. - A RMS cost center charges only direct
costs to a NIF cost center (Ref . 26)
.
Contrary to established NIF principles there is not a
general overhead expense applied to the total cost. This
slight deviation from NIF procedures is one of the effects
present in PMTC current fiscal operations that is related to
its dual mode financial management. Instead, general
overaead is treated as an indirect overhead, allocated on a
total population basis and added to a NIF directorate over
head expense.
NIF directorates receive their funds for assets
acquistion or improvement by two means. The dollars are
either appropriated via a budget request or become available
from the industrial fund. The choice of which alternative
method to use for equipment replacement/modernization
depends on the dollar value involved and/or initial
utilization of equipment. Fund requests of less than £50,000
may be financed from the industrial fund with recovery of
expenditure coming from operating costs charged to users.
Costs of acquistions or improvements greater than $50,000
will be financed under appropriated funds. Machinery or
equipment authorized within a customer order for fulfilling
the work task may be financed from the industrial fund with
recovery of costs from the customer. Equipment acquired in
this manner will be disposed of in accordance with the
user's instruction (Ref. 24).
Appendix A gives the major users of NMC and their
respective funds spent at the facility.
D. FUTURE DIRECTION OF PMTC FISCAL MANAGEMENT
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For FY-77 and on PMTC will operate under a modified NIF
concept called Reimbursable Institutional Funding (RIF)
.
RIF, developed by NATC Patuxent River Financial and
Operating Cost Center, calls for institutional funding of an
installation overhead generated by its range functions, with
the range services direct cost paid for by the user. All
non-range cost centers will operate under the normal NIF
procedure, receiving reimbursement by users for the total
costs incurred. Implementation of RIF at PMTC will cause a
thorough examination of all directorates for the
determination of cost centers which have a range related
task and those which do not. The opportunity to have a cost
center overhead expense absorbed by institutional funds vice
customers' dollars could have a striking effect on the cost
estimates PMTC will give to customers in the futute. An
indication of this is the example stated earlier of five NIF
activities and the difference in the rate per hour charged
to a customer and that which the installation experienced.
By using RIF, PMTC and the Navy will be satisfying two
conditions. The first is the uniform funding plan advocated
by Mr. Bergguist's study group for all 26 major T&S support
activities and implemented by DODDIR 3200.11. The second
condition being met is the increased fiscal control and
motivation a NIF financially organized activity gives to
management.
The existing cost estimate procedure used in responding
to a customer's inguiries is scheduled for improvement. The
present system calls for a PMTC Project Officer, upon
receiving a proposed work request, to pass on to the cost
centers concerned a list of services or goods a user seeks
to have filled. Each cost center forwards along its
proposed cost estimate based on the labor, instrumentation,
material, and other items involved. The Project Officer,
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assisted by a finanical analysist, then totals the bids and
presents PMTC's proposal (Ref. 29) .
The current system has several drawbacks. A cost
center cost estimates for similar services requested by two
different customers might not be identical since there
exists inconsistency in who prepares the proposed costs.
Likewise, conflict could exists between the Project Officer
and the cost center manager. A Project Officer is inclined
to present an optimistic price estimate on labor and
material containing no margin for misfortune or overruns to
a customer. This is in contrast to a cost center manager's
compelling motivation to ensure full employment of bis
personnel and a shop operating at full capacity. The cost
estimates a shop manager passes on for the services
requested could reflect this view (Ref. 30) . The presence
of either individual's subconcious tendency may cause an
inaccurate cost proposal to be presented to the potential
user, having all concerned suffer the effects.
PMTC is working towards comprising a "catalogue" of all
the goods and services that could be offered by the
installation and their stated costs. This proposed cost
determination system will necessitate extensive research and
investigation into all PMTC services rendered and goods
produced (Ref. 29) . Initially, a determination of the
actual costs expended on completing these functions in the
past must be accomplished. Once actual costs are computed,
an analysis should be done on costs for both validation of
cost averaging and to ensure the efficient use of resources
in accruing the expenses. This cost validation analysis
will be a reoccurring event to ensure cost proposals stay in




v - TEST AND EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
A. MOTIVATION
Trips made to Point Hugu provided the authors with a
fairly comprehensive impression of the role field activities
play in the TSE evolution. Personnel at PMTC were interested
in improving their relationship with Project Managers and,
consequently, fostering a cooperative atmosphere. Personnel
interviewed felt that they were operating in a competitive
environment and that PMTC would have to actively solicit for
participation in future weapons programs. To accomplish
their objective they felt a need to: first, know what the
plans for future weapons systems are, second,, convey to
Project Managers what their capabilities are for meeting
these demands. They did not feel a suitable mechanism
existed to achieve this objective.
The existence of a competitive environment has also
been noted and approved with restrictions by higher
authority. The Chief of Naval Material, in NAVMATINST
5450.27, stated:
"...these activities have operated under broad mission
statements and often overlapping functional
assignments which have generated competition for
resources. While this policy was acceptable during
a period of transition, continuing progress in the
establishment and strengthening of 'R&D centers
makes it desirable at this time to modify and
restate policy so as to focus more sharply the
resources and efforts of each laboratory and
center. It is tae intent of this instruction to
strike a balance between, on the one hand, a rigid
definition of functions that would create
monopolies, deprive sponsors of flexibility, and
lead to a decrease in technical options and, on
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the other hand, a dispersion of capabilities that
would foster duplication, decrease effective
application of resources, and promote competition
for programs and resources. Flexibility and
dynamic operation are recognized as keys to
success in research and development operations.
Thus the policies enunciated herein are designed
to encourage creativity,- to provide alternative
technical approaches, to control competition, and
to ensure coordination of in-house efforts."
In order to obtain a clearer idea of the relationship
existing between the user and the facilities, it was decided
to obtain the opinions of the Project Managers. Road trips
by PMTC personnel to Washington D. C. indicated a wide
variety of viewpoints existed concerning this relationship
(Kef. 31). The data obtained was considered insufficient to
form any definite conclusions. The best method for
obtaining additional information would be through personal
interviews with the Washington based Project Managers.
Although desirable, this method was discounted due to
funding and time constraints. The next best alternative was
to conduct a nail survey.
Formulation of the questionnaire was predicated on
learning the views and opinions of Project Managers in
certiin key areas of T6E. Through background investigation,
research trips, and interviews conducted relative to the Pils
and their interaction with the facilities, there surfaced
five managerial functions that needed further exploration.
Little was understood oi the criteria used by PMs in their
selection of a T&E facility; what were the factors and their
order of importance? The latitude a Project Manager has in
selecting a T&E facility was not known. It was felt that
constraints such as technical conditions, project urgency,
or DCP requirements might dictate which facility a PH must
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use. The method used by a Project Manager to familiarize
himself with the different installations was not known. Does
he rely on past experience, other PMs, publications, liaison
offices, a staff within the Systems Command, or a
combination of these as his information source? Since
competition does exist between T&E facilities, it was
thought important to measure the Pil's feelings towards this
competitive environment. Furthermore, what were their
opinions on the quality of services provided?
Once the categories for PM's responses were determine!,
formulation of the statements to explore those areas was
begun. Wording of individual statements was aided through
discussions held with individuals having T&E experience.
Construction and validation of the statements was an
involved process requiring the selection of response format
and data analysis to be used, and location of a test
sampling group to ensure question content and validity. A
five choice response format was chosen as a reasonable
solution to both the response format and data analysis
requirements. This response format provided ease of data
reduction and adaptability to the Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS) on file at the Naval Postgraduate
School computer center. It also permitted the respondent a
degree of flexibility in answering the questions.
After each category was thoroughly covered by its
statements, an initial version of the questionnaire was
prepared. Personnel with prior TSE experience were located
and used as the test sampling group. Objectives of the
questionnaire were explained to the individuals. The group
was asked not only to complete the questionnaire but to
communicate their comments concerning the composition and
validity of each statement to the authors, either on the
questionnaire or in person. Responses from the sample group
were used to modify and improve the questionnaire before
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mailing. Although the questionnaire was principally
designed and directed to the Project Managers, it was felt
some of the same issues were applicable to the OPTEVFOR
community. Hence, the questionnaire was sent to VX-1 and
VX-5.
B. QUESTIONNAIRE
This section presents the objective, result, and the
conclusion reached for each question. Responses received
from the questionnaire were examined and transfered to data
cards for tabulation by the SPSS package. Results were then
printed out in a format similar to that used in the SPSS
package. Appendix B contains the questionnaire and input
data. Abbreviations utilized are as follows: S. A. -strongly
agree, A. -agree, N.O.-no opinion, D.-disagree / S. D. -strongly
disagree
.
P.u§s.t:i°Il ll f:ore than one Test and Evaluation (T&E) facility
was capable of providing the similar services needed for my
pro jsct.
1. Objective: Desired to establish the existence
of more than one T&E facility which had similar
environment (land, sea, or air), technical support, and
physical plant to conduct the T&E required on a
project. An implied assumption was made that no two
facilities are identical in capabilities; but when an
installation's functions are presented in the aggregate
the summation of those capabilities are approximately
equal to another installation capability total. This
information could have been partially retrieved from a
library research of the DoD's ranges and test
facilities. A search of that type however, would not
have indicated the perception held by Project Managers
and Project Officers towards the existence of more than
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one T&E facility capable of meeting their needs. One
of the factors needed to show the existence of a














A. N.O. D. S.D.
33.3% 28.6% 19.0%
60.0% 5.0% 15.0% 10.0%





3. Conclusions; Most managers surveyed agree that
duplicate capability exists at many installations.
Most noticeable is the almost even split among the
Project Managers in Washington towards this statement.
Since facilities with comparable functions are present,
it is reasonable to assume the occurrance of
competition between activities.
Question 2l Tne technical constraints of my project limited
selection to one TSE facility
1. Objective: It was believed that the technical
requirements of a program's T&E could be of such an
unique nature as to restrict a Project Manager to a
single facility. There are several weapon systems that
do require special TSE functions and would confine the
selection process to only one activity. The relative
size of the two groups, technically restrictive and non
restrictive, was unknown. Additionally, the statement


















A. IS.O. D. S.D.
30.0% 5.0% 40.0% 10.0%
20. 0* 5. Of. 60.0% 5.0%





3. Conclusion: Responses from Project Managers
are the significant ones in this statement. Project
Managers are concerned with a weapon system RSD and
developmental TSE in constrast to OPTEVOR'S function of
operational TSE. RSD and developmental TSE contain the
area of greater technical constraints. Size of the two
groups, technically restrictive and non restrictive, as
viewed by Washington is approximately equal. A
sizeable numbers of projects are compelled to use the
one facility possessing those unique characteristics
needed for the weapon system TSE. Good correlation
exists between questions 1 and 2 relative to duplicate
TSE facilities, i.e., 45% of the Project Managers
believed they are technically constrained and 48,?
believed duplicate ISE facilities do not exist for
their project.
Question ^1 Tne urgency of my project limited selection to
one TSE facility.
1: Objective: Two factors were considered in this
statement, time and existing capabilities at TSE
installations. The two elements are directly related
and dependent on the other. The longer the lead time a
project has, the greater is the possibility that
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additional facilities could adapt to the T&E
specification requirements; and conversely for a short
lead time. As with the objectives for question 2, the
relative size of these two groups, short lead time or
long, was unknown.
2. Results:
Responses S.A • A. N.O. D. S.D.
PM'S 20 5. 0% 30.0% 20.0% 4 0.0% 5.0%
VX« S 20 5.0% 25.0% 60.0% 10.0%
ALL 40 2. 5% 17.5% 22.5% 50.0% 7.5%
MEAN MEDIAbI
PM'S 3. 100 3.250
vx»s 3. 750 3.833
ALL 3. 425 3.650
. 3: Conclusion: Urgency plays a signif iciaiit role
at the Project Manager level and is almost nonexistent
in OPTEVFOR. Urgency could be another element affecting
PM's perception of duplicate capability among T&E
installations.
Question, la Current publications provide a useful source of
information on the capabilities of T&E facilities.
1: Objective: Very little is understood of the
technique used by Project Managers to acquaint
themselves with the various T&E facilities. There are
numerous publicat ions, distributed both by the
installations and the Services, that describe the
mission, functions, and existing technical assets of
the T&E facilities. It was felt that these publications
either do not meet the information needs of the Project




es S. A. A. N.O. D. S.D.
42.9% 23.8% 23.8% 9.5%
25.0% 10.0% 40.0% 25.0^











3. Conclusion: Printed information on
installations and services they can offer needs to be
improved. Current publications are not providing a
useful source of information to OPTEVFOR and are
disregarded by more than half of the PMs. It appears
that an improved flow of information to the users of
T&E facilities at an economical cost is possible
through better constructed and formulated publications.
Question 5x Other Pro ject Managers provide a useful source
of information on the capabilities of T&E facilities.
1. Objective: In the investigation of the method
used by Project Managers in gaining a knowledge of an
installation's functions and ability, it was suspected
that other individuals play a role. A key person might
be another Project Manager. Possibly his predecessor,
in the pass down, left either written or verbal
information as to a facility's capabilities.
Additionally, existing Project Managers, acting as a
corporate memory, could be a source of knowledge and a








5. A > • A. N.O. D. S.D.
4. 8% 6 1.9% 14.3% 14.3% 4„8X
30. 0% 35.5% 10.0% 25.0%








3. Conclusion: An important reservoir of knowledge
and information is an individual's contemporaries. The
reputation and past associations a facility has among
this group will . affect future relations. Tnis
"informal" information link can provide much valuable
information which would require volumes of technical
manuals to cover. There is, however, the danger of
loss of objectivity in the utilization of such a
source. One especially good or bad incident may
greatly color an individual's attitude toward an
installation. There also exists the danger of not
completely weighing all the factors but merely going
with the "current favorites".
Question 6j_ Liaisons from T&E facilities provide a usefal
source of information on the capabilities of their
facilities.
1. Objective: Most TSE facilities maintain a
Washington liaison office. The office forms a
communication channel between the Systems Command
Headquarter and the field installation. It would appear
that these liaison offices should be a center of
available information and a sou.:cc capable of answering
a Project Manager's inquiries. An indication oi their
effectiveness as a useful source of information should
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es S.I L . A. N.O. D. S.D.
19. OS 42.9% 9. 5% 23.8% 4.8%
20. 0% 6O.OF0 5.0% 1 5 . %













3. Conclusion: Liaison between the T8E activity
and OPTEVFOR appears to be strong and effective. There
is adequate communication between Washington and the
TSE installations, but not totally effective. A large
number of Project Managers are not being reached, as
indicated by the 38% negative response from this group.
A liaison office which can effectively present current
information on its installation capabilities and
technical expertise to the PMs could be a valuable,
asset to a decision maker during his selection process.
Question 7j_ A Project Manager's previous ^ssic^nnierit provides
a valuable source on information on the capabilities of T&2
faciiiies.
1. Objective: It was thought that a Project
Manager might already have a well conceived impression
of existing capabilities at TSE installations. These
impressions are based upon previous experiences gained
from T&E related billets or operational duties.
Question 36 addresses previous T&E experiences.
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A. N.O. D. S.D.
28.6% 9.5% 2 3.8%
30.0% 10.0% 10.0% 15.0%
















3. Conclusion: As stated in the conclusion of
Question 5, reputation and past associations between an
individual and a facility will form the basis for
future relations. A significant number of individuals,
2/3 of the respondents, have formed opinions of various
T&E inscallations prior to assuming their current
position. A decision maker's evaluation of an
installation's capabilities and expertise based
partially on past memory contains an inherent danger.
Past memory can be heavily influenced by one
siginificant happening, good or bad, which occured
during an individual's association with the activity
and obscure the existing capability level of the
facility.
£u.ss_tion &1 Staff assistance within a Systems. Command is
useful in determining the capabilities of T&E facilities.
1, Objective: Determine if a Project Hanager
receives assistance from his Systems Command on
facility selection. It was thought that the Systeas
Command should perform a staff function of aiding a PK
during his analysis of T&E requirements and
installations capable of satisfying them. ihe Systems
Command staff should act as an independent cent i ,ili7.>", d




A. N.O. D. S.D.
55.0% 10.0% 25.0% 5.0%
50.0% 35.0% 10.0% 5.0%





supplement a PM's small staff with knowledgealbe










3. Conclusion: Some staff 'assistance is occuring
at both the OPTEVFOR and Systems Command levels.
Improved staff assistance might reduce the reliance on
less than totally objective information presently being
used by an individual. Information received from
liaison offices, coretemporaries, and past assignments
can fall into this category of "less than totally
objective".
£u£stion 92, There is a significant difference in costs to
projects from T&E facilities offering comparable services.
1. Objective: This stateroeat and the next was
prepared to help investigate the role played by costs
in selecting a T&E activity. From research done into
the fiscal area of T&E, it is known that various
installations can offer significantly different cost
proposals. (The uniform funding policy established for
the MRTFB does not define a uniform cost rate to be
used. Uniform funding policy indicates who pays the
overhead, and leaves the determination of direct labor
and material rates to the individual activity.)
Response to the question would indicate the awareness
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of Project Managers and Project Officers to costs and
indirectly the importance of costs in their selection.
Queston 16 produces futher information on an
individual's concern for cost proposals. Comparable
services was used to emphasis that the the variances in
costs were for similar work requests.
2. Results:
Responses S.A. A. N.O. D. S«D.
PM'S 21 19.0% 33.3% 38.1% 9.5%
VX'S 20 30.0% 30.0% 23.0% 15.0^




ALL ' 2.317 2.308
3. Conclusion: A majority of those responding
indicate their acknowledgement of substantial cost
differences. What is interesting is the large
percentage of no opinion registered to this statement.
It is hard to conceive of stimulating a blank comment,
no opinion, towards the question unless one is
unconcerned with costs.
£ii£§tion 10.JL Different funding techniques (NIF/RMS , etc) used
by TSE facilities tend to mask the actual T&E cost of a
project.
1. Objective: As discussed in Chapter 4 on
financial management, costs paid by a PM could be
either direct or total depending on what funding
system, NIF or MRTFE, the installation is under. The
funding method in relation to costs projected to a user
is immaterial to Services and utlimately DoD, as the
Defense Department roust budget and pay for all costs.









If a Project Manager was not aware of these facts, he
could be swayed to select a facility that on the
surface was projecting the least cost, but has the
greatest total costs. The reader is referred back to
Chapter 4 Section 1 and the example of the five NIF











3. Conclusion: Most individuals are aware of the
effects certain funding techniques have on masking the
actual total costs incurred on a project to the DcD.
There appears to be some inconsistency between the
responses in this question and the last one on
significant cost differences, especially from Project
Managers. One would expect a higher no opinion-
response on a more sosphiscated statement such as this
one, but the opposite happened. It is easier to
explain a lack of knowledge in a specified area then to
justify a lack of concern.
O.^£st.ion ill Once a T£E facility has been chosen for a
project a project manager has no latitude in altering the
selection.
1. Objective: Once a selection was made
designating a facility to perform certain TiE
functions, it was not known if this selection could be
8 3

altered. Futhertnore a doubt persisted as to the
existence of Project Managers and Project Officers'
authority to execute such altering. It was assumed
that the change in TGE facilities was due to cause.
2. Results:
Responses ; S. A. A. N.O. D. S.D.
PM«S 20 10. 0% 25.0% 5.0% 55.0% 5.0%
VX'S 20 5..0% 10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 5.0%
ALL 40 7. 5% 17.5% 22.5% 47.5% 5c 0%
MEAN MEDIAN
PM«S 3. 200 3.682
VX'S 3. 300 3.375
ALL 3. 250 3.553
3. Conclusion: Selection of a T&E facility can be
altered and a Project Manager does have the authority
to execute the change. Responses from OPTEVFOR present
a mixed picture as to the latitude of a Project Officer
in changing TSE facilities. Approximately half believe
they do possess the authority and the other half does
not know, as represented in the no opinion percentage.
Question Ylz_ As regards to facilities offering comparable
services, there is a significant difference in the
iB.iL2£!sLii:2I*. ^^§£.^^£K provided to a project manager to
effectively monitor the progress of his project.
1. Objective: There presently exists varying forms
of management information systems at. T&E installations.
A management information system should feed useful and
timely data not only to those on the station but also
to a PM, who is ultimately responsible for his project.
It was not known if wide differences of quality existed
in management information systems. The existence of a
better information system which gives a Program Manager
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es S.A. A. N.O. D. S.D.
25:0% 30.0% 40.0% 5.0%
15.0% 25.0% 40.0% 15.0% 5.0%





improved control over his program, night persuade hi in
to select and work with that facility. This could be
especially important to a manager from the Washington
area working with a distant facility.
2. Results:






3. Conclusion: The objective was not met due to
poor formulation of the question. Some believe good
information systems do exist. Others did not know how
to interpret the statement, as indicated by the large
no opinion response.
^!i§Sti°J} Hi There is a significant difference in the
technical expertise of r&E facilities offering comparable
services
.
1. Objective: T&£ activities do offer similar
functions and capabilities, but this does not give a
complete picture of their ability to perform T&E.
Personnel experience and reputation play an important
role in the successful completion or a program. Do
differences in technical expertise and reputation exist




es S.A. A. N.O. P- S.D
30.,0% 45.0% 10.0% 15.0ft
20..0% 20.0% 30.0% 30.0%











3. Conclusion: At the Washington level a
perception of different technical expertise strongly
exists. In the Binds of the Project Managers, some T&E
facilities have superior personnel, and to take the
results a step futher, superior quality of
capabilities. QPTEVF0R projects a mixed feeling and no
futher conclusion can be drawn.
2ii£5ii21i li£ : As regards to facilities offering
comparable services, there is a significant difference
in the ease of obtaining non-routine information on the
progress of a project.
1. Objective: Apart from the periodic reporting on
a project's status the Project Manager often has need
for additional information not contained in these
reports. Personal interviews have indicated some
difficulty in obtaining non-routine information. In
particuliar, some activities have more than one contact
point for information concerning a project. This
question was designed to measure the ease of obtaining
non-routine information. Results could be useful in
determining the overall coordination and communicative
feedback existing within the activities.
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A. N.C). D. S.D.
25.0% 30. 0% 20. 0%
40.0% 35. 0%














3. Conclusions: This -question appears to have
raised a valid point, since only ten percent of the
respondents indicated disagreement. Interestingly
enough, none of the VX respondents disagreed which may
raise doubt az to facilities' overall cooperation with
operational T&E units. Perhaps the lower rank of VX
Project Officers in comparison with Project Managers
might have an effect on the ease of obtaining
non-routine information. Results from this question
indicate that some facilities have done a better job of





£u££ti2I} 15:. Funding level for T&E facilities' modernization
is adequate to support my project's needs.
1. Objective: Recent cuts in the Defense budget
have resulted in the curtailment of modernization and
expansion of TCE facilities. The effects of these
cutbacks may have already begun to decrease TGE
facilities' effectiveness in meeting a user's needs.
This question was designed to evaluate the degree to
which existing projects have been affected by a













A. N.O. D. S.D.
36.8% 36.8% 10.5% 10.5 CS
25.0% 4 0.0* 25.0?3 10.055





3. Conclusions: Overall, opinions on this question
were evenly spread with VX respondents indicating so.^e
dissatisfaction with project support. Since there is no
previous data to indicate how Project Managers/Officers
felt in the past concerning funding adequacy no valid
conclusions could be made as to whether cutbacks were
significantly affecting program support.
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2u£§tion Iki. Rank each of the following factors with respect








1. Objective: In selecting a TSE facility offering
comparable services for his project a Project Manager
presumeably considers the comparability between
facilities for the identified parameters. Personal
interviews indicate that a facility may tend to
understate their cost estimates in order to attract
additional business. In any event there may exist a
wide spread difference between estimated and actual
costs which would tend to diminish the credibility of
cost estimates and consequently decrease its importance
in the facility selection process. The logistics
parameter is aimed at identifying to what extent a
facility's geographical location and support services
take in the selection consideration. The other
parameters are indications of the quality of services
provided which may vary extensively between facilities
The objective of this question was to determine which




(1 = Host Important)
Selec:tion I rapeirtance
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MEAN
1 12 15 7 4 3.615
6 18 3 7 5 2.667
26 5 5 2 1 2 1.64 1
2 1 5 7 9 15 4.667
3 4 10 8 7 6 1 3.872














3. Conclusions: Respondents generally agreed that
technical capability and personnel expertise were of
primary importance. Cost estimates narrowly outranked
program cooperation for the third highest ranking.
Apparently logistics and test scheduling are of little
importance compared to the other parameters. Two
respondents provided additional parameters: one
••unspecified", the other ranked "ability to simulate
operational environment" fourth.
Question JZl Rank the following T£E facilities "in their
overall effectiveness in providing satisfactory services to
Project Managers.
1. Most Effective - - 8. Least Effective
A. Naval Weapon Center, China Lake
B. Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu
C. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River
D. Armament Development and Test Center, Eglin AFE
E. White Sands Missile Range
f. U.S. Army Proving Grounds
G, Atlantic Fleet Weapons Range
H. Air Force Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB
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1. Objective; This guestion was designed to
determine the image different T&E facilities project to
potential users. The choice was limited to facilities
capable of providing services to airborne weapon
systems and hopefully the personnel surveyed would have
some familiarity with or impressions of the
effectiveness of the respective facilities. This
question was not designed to determine a facility's
actual effectiveness but merely to ascertain an idea of
the reputation enjoyed by these facilities.
2. Results:
FREQUENCY OF EFFECTIVENESS RANKING









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN
7 2 1 1 2.231
7 2 3 1 2.846
5 3 1 -> 1 /L » .3 3 -r
2 Z 4.0
1 1 3 1 1 3.286
1 1 1 1 4.5
1 1 1 1 1 ».6
1 1 1 1 5.0









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN
4 1 1 1.5
1 1 2 2.6
1 1 2 2.250
• 2 1 2.333















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN
9 2 1.182
1 6 1 2 2.4
1 2 1 1 3.375
1 2 1 1 3.250
1 1 1 3.0
1 1 7.333
1 1 1 1 5.750
1 2 6.667
Overall Relative Ranking
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MEAN
20 5 3 1 1 1.7
2 14 5 6 1 2.643
7 4 7 3 2 1 2.667
1 2 5 1 3 3.250
1 3 4 3 1 1 3.538
1 1 3 3 5.750
2 1 1 2 3 1 5 . 3









3. Conclusions: Overall, NWC, China lake was
clearly the most popular facility. Even VX-4 which is
stationed at Point Mugu and primarily uses facilities
of PMTC preferred NWC to PKTC. If familiarity caused
an unfavorable bias towards a particuliar facility this
did not reduce VX-5'5 ranking of NWC below number one
spot. It is of no suprise that the Navy facilities
rated highest since respondents were mostly Naval
Officers. It may be worthwhile for facilities to
follow-up on these results and find out what makes
other facilities more appealing to potential users.
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2y.££tion J82. Increased competition among TSE facilities
would increase the effectiveness of services provided to
project managers.
1. Objective: In commercial enterprises competition
has traditionally benefitted customers since it
inherently fosters more efficient and effective
services. In the military, however, an increase in
duplicative functions may not be feasible due to
political considerations. This question was designed
to survey the opinions of users considering both the
benefits derived from increased competition as well as









3» Conclusions: In general, respondents did not
favor increased competition as a viable means of
increasing effectiveness of services. If a majority
disagreement had been anticipated it would have been
worthwhile to ask "why not ?". It may be that
respondents consider outright competition in the
military as an infeasible concept.
£u£3tion J9: Competition among TSE facilities should be
eliminated in order to reduce the additional cost of
overlapping capabilities.
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es S.A A. N-0. D. S.D.
10. 0% 25.0% 15.0% 30.0 % 20. 0£
15. 01 25. 0% 45.0% 45.0% 10.0%








1. Objective: Related to the previous question this
one was designed to solicit opinions for total
elimination of competition due to cost considerations.
Hopefully the respondent would weigh the benefits
derived from competition as it presently exists against






5. A. A. N.O. D. S.D.
25.0% 35.0% 30.0% 10.0%
10*0% 45.0% 15.0% 30.0% 20.0%












3. Conclusions: Overall, respondents opposed to
increased competition were in favor of reduced
competition. The results may have been affected by
present public concern over wasteful military spending.
It is questionable whether or not elimination of
competition would be financially beneficial in the long
run.
Question 2J? : Selection of a contractor influences the
selection of a T&E facility.
Objective: Basically self explanatory, this question
was designed primarily to determine if a contractor's
geographical accessibility to a facility or preference
to have a particuliar facility perform the T&E has any















A. N.O. D. S.D.
14.3% 14.3% 57.1% 14.3%
20.0% 40.0% 25.0% 5.0%





Conclusions: Although most respondents had no
opinion or disagreed it is interesting that at least
some respondents felt contractors do have an influence.
It may be worthwhile for facilities to determine in
what situations or for which contractors, contractor
selection has an influence.
Question Zll DCPs are overly restrictive in their testing
requirements and thus limit the Project Manager's selection
to one T&E facility.
1. Objective: This question had a two-fold
objective. One was to determine the degree of
confinement placed on the PM Ly the DC? or if he was
permitted to utilize various facilities and make an
effective managerial decision. If the DCP were to
clearly dictate one T&E facility, other factors would
become unimportant. Additionally, it was hoped to gain
some more insight as to the uniqueness of the missions
of each facility and degree of overlap. It would also
help to isolate the point of time in the planning c^cle
when a facility seemed destined to get the project.

2. Results:
Responses ; S. A. A. N.O. D. S. D.
PM« s 21 9.5a 9,5% 33.3% 42.9% 4.8S
VX'S 20 10.0% 5. 0% 35.0% 5.0*
All 41 ii.9% 9.8% 41.5% 3 9.0% 4.93
MEAN MEDIAE f









Conclusions: Although the question received a
large number of " no opinion ", there appears to be
general agreement that most DCPs do not dictate the use
of one particular facility. The large non-committal
population may indicate that DCPs are restrictive
enough to indicate the use of a particular facility but
nebulous enough that an aggressive PM could easily
justify the use of other facilities. It appears that in
regards to satisfying the requirements of a DCP that
there is considerable overlap in missions of the
various facilities as interpretted by the user.
£u.£§!iL2.Ii i.2i_ Weapon systems T&E requirements are identified
early enough to permit funding justification for facility
modernization.
1. Objective; With the advent of the NIF and KKTFB
funding system, T6E facilities will undoubtedly becor
3
more cost-conscious in the selection of internal
improvements, i.e. only those which will earn them an
effective rate of return. The resulting capability
uniqueness may require a greater time period in which
to prepare for the TCE requirements of a project. It is
therefore imperative that these requirements be
identified early in the planning cycle so as not to
cause delays later, on. Although it must be recognized
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that due to the relative short period of time since the
introduction of NIF into T&E facilities that this
uniqueness may just be developing, it was desired to
get a current basis for the lead-time problem.
2. Results:
es S . A
.
A. N.O. D. S.D.
38. 1% 14.3% 3 8 . 1 % 9.5%
15.0% 30.0% 30.0% 25.0%













3. Conclusions: Although the PMs appear pretty
evenly split over this issue, the VX Project Officers
appear to be currently experiencing some .problems in
this area. T&E facilities may be more in tune to the
DT&E aspects of programs than to the OT&E requirements
of OPTEVFOR. Additionally, personal interviews with VX
Project Officers indicated that schedule slippage
during DT&E often caused a compression of time allotted
for OT&E.
Question 2.1k T&s facilities are consistent in their method
of assigning project priorities for completion.
1. Objective: Although OPNAV instructions provide
general guidance for the assignment of project
priorities, it was desired to ascertain such things as
if perhaps small projects received less priority than
large continuing projects as a result of the financial
impact on the facility. It was also desired to know if
a project could expect equal treatment at several




Respon ses; All Host Some Few None
PM'S 17 29.4% 23.5% 41.2% 5.9%
VX'S 19 42. 1% 31.6% 15.8% 10.5%
ALL 36 36. 1% 27.8% 27.8% 8.3%
MEAN MEDIAN
PM'S 3. 235 3.375
\
VX'S 2. 947 2.750
ALL 3. 083 3.000
3. Conclusions: VX Project Officers appear to
receive more consistent (good or bad) treatment as
regards their project priorities. Project Managers tend
to disagree that there is a consistent method of
assigning priorities. Perhaps one factor in this is the
existence of long-term working relationships between
various PMs and specific facilities.
Question
.iiil TSE facilities show a genuine interest in
providing program support for successful completion of the
project.
1. Objective: This question was designed to
determine the type of environment a PM finds himself in
after contracting with a facility. Do they follow
through with services promised? Are they interested in
his project problems and thus provide the "extras"
beyond the requested tests? Are facilities more
interested in acquiring new projects than completing
the ones thev have?
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Most Some Few None
42. 1% 26.3% 5.3%
47.4% 21.1% 15.8%














3. Conclusions: Although the term . "program
support" may not have been adequately defined, most
respondents seem pleased with the cooperation they
receive with their projects. VX Project Officers may
not receive the same degree of support in that their
projects are often grouped together under the
cognizance of one program manager at a facility due to
their limited requirements.
2^.^§^i;2E 25l Deficiencies noted by the PM in a project's
progress are examined and corrected by the T&E facilities.
1. Objective: This was designed to indicate the
degree of flexioility of a facility and also its
willingness to accept constructive criticise by the
user. It was felt that the user should be assured tnat
his viewpoint would be listened to and not dwarfed by
the magnitude of the T&E business. Additionally,
facilities should have a system by which these
deficiencies may be reviewed and erradicated.
2. Results:
Eespon ses All Most Some Few None
PM'S 20 10.0% 4 5.0 % 20.0? 20.0% 5.0%
VX« S 18 J j . -> ',i> 27.8% 38.9 5







3. Conclusions: The results somewhat parallel that
for program support. VX Project Officers, expectedly,
do not feel they have the power to cause a change in
deficient areas at many facilities. PMs adopting a
more strongly-opinionated (all or none) stand than VX
Project Officers on this issue is an interesting
reversal to the normal trend noted in other questions. '
Question 26^ T&E facilities capable of providing services
for my project have shown eagerness for my project.
1. Objective: Eagerness for a project may be shown
in a number of ways. Two noticeable ways are through
liaison and scheduling. Reference (31) indicated that
the "marketing" effort of the T&E facilities varied
considerably. NWC was cited as having a very
well-organized, well-run liaison group in the
Washington area. It was desired to ascertain how many
of the facilities were able to impress the managers of
their interests in obtaining projects through their
liaisons. Eagerness for involvement may also be
detected by the ease in which PMs can coordinate the
scheduling of services with a facility.
2. Results:
Responses Ail
PM'S 20 3 5.0%
VX'S 19 10.5%
ALL 39 2 3. 1
^
MOSt Some Few None
3 0.0% 25. 0^ 10.0%
4 2 . 1 ;t 2&. 3% 10.5% 10.5%







3- Conclusions: Due to the relative difference in
dollar value, it is probably not surprising that the
PMs experienced a greater eagerness from the facilities
than did the Project Officers of the VX squadrons. What
is particularly noteworthy is that no PM answered
"none", which seems to indicate that facilities are not
saturated with projects to the point of not wanting to
compete for new projects.
Question 27^ T&E facilities actively participate in the
selection process of weapon system test assignment.
1. Objective: This question was designed to
measure the current extent of " marketing " on the part
of T&E facilities. Although some of the data on the
capabilities of the facilities are tabulated in the
various references cited earlier, it was recognized
that many tests require very unique utilization of
equipment. Since PM. staffs are limited in size it
appeared that, additional aid must come from both within
NAVAIR and the facilities. T&E facilities themselves
seem most highly qualified to tell the managers what








Most Some Few None
11.1% 44. 4% 1 1 . 1 % 16.7,;
27. Q% 27.8% 33.3% 1 1 . 1 %














3. Conclusions: Perhaps the term "actively
participate" required better definition. The results
seem to indicate, however, that there is not a lot of
current involvement on the part of the facility. While
this may be good from the standpoint of obtaining an
independent decision, it seems that an important source
of information remains untapped.
Question 28^ Khat is youu rank/GS level?
1. Objective: The objective was fairly
straightforward. It was desired to ascertain this
information in order to have the ability to correlate
data from any gustion by groups according to rank.. This
also served as a check to see if the questionnaire . had*
been filled out by the decision maker and thus
reflected his opinions or delegated to some other
individual.
08 GS9 GS14 GS15
11 12
1 1 2
3. Conclusions: It appeared that most
questionnaires were completed by the decision makeu cr
by high level staff assistants and thus it was assumed
that they accurately reflected the thought process
behind the selection process.
2. Eesult s:
RESPONSES 03 on 05 06 07
PM'S 20 1 2 11 1
VX'S 19 10 7 2
ALL 39 10 8 4 11 1
10:

Question 29^ Highest lev(;l formal education achieved.
1. Objective: As in the previous question
additional background information was desired. Coupled
with question number 30, it provides valuable insight
on the backgrounds of these very important decision
makers.
2. Results:
RESP AA BS/BA MS (TECH) MS (NON-TECH) DOC DUAL/MS
PM«S 20 25.0% 50. Of* 15.0% 5.0% 5.0%
VX'S 19 7 3.7% 15.8% 5.3% 5.3%
ALL 39 48.7% 33.3% 10.3% 5.1% 2.6%
3. Conclusions: As might be expected, most PMs
held a Masters Degree in a technical area and their
more junior counterparts in VX squadrons held BS/BA
Degrees. All respondents held the equivalent of a
Baccalaureate or higher. It is noteworthy to observe
that few respondents held Masters degree in
non-technical areas even though a large percentage of
their effort may be in management.
Question 30j_ Number of years involved in T&E assignments.
1. Objective: As in question 28 and 29 additional
background information was desired.
2. Results:
RE spons;BS 1 2 3 U 5 6 9 10 15 25
PM' S 20 4 1 u u. 2 1 1 1
VX'S 19 7 9 2 1
ALL 39 u 7 10 2 5 n 2 1 2 1 1
MEAN M EDI AH rI
PM'S 12. , 15 6..000





3. Conclusions: Question 7 indicated a high
reliance by PMs or. their previous experience and
assignments. The results of this question does not,
however, indicate an abundance of previous experience
in TSE assignments. On the contrary, it seems to
indicate a definite need for a strong liaison between
the " experts in T&E " and the PM who in many respects
is acting as a corporate manager.
C. EESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The response received from the questionnaire was
excellent. Preliffiinary expectations, based on opinions of
marketing experts, forecast a completed return of 30-50% of
all questionnaires sent out with possible increases
obtainable from additional follow-up. The survey producer,
however, an overall response of 75%. This tremendous
response seems to indicate a high degree of interest and
concern in the areas covered by the questionnaire. It is
also noteworthy that, the questionnaires appeared to have
been thoughtfully filled out by the decision makers,
themselves, as indicated by the rank profile.
Questions 3 and 22 failed to clearly establish the
degree and type of urgency experienced at the VX level.
Although the Project Officers did not feel United to one
facility as a result of the urgency of their project, most
agreed that the urgency prevented adequate time for facility
modernization and improvements to complete the T&E.
Questions 1,2,3, and 21 attempted to ascertain if and
why PMs might be limited to one facility. Over 60% of all
respondents felt that more than one facility was able to
provide the services they required. Of those constrained to
one facility, technical constraints was the major cause. At
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the PM level, urgency contributed substantially to the
remainder with limitations of an overly-restrictive DCP
being relatively minor.
Questions 1, 18, 19, and 26 all addressed the area of
competition. Results indicate that a competitive
environment does exist and installations appear to be eager
for more business. Competition among facilities as viewed by
the Project Managers and Project Officers is not favored and
should be reduced. Futhermore, it appears the managers
believe that by not only reducing but by eliminating
competition, i.e., do away with installations 1 overlapping
capabilities, costs of TSE could be lowered.
Results of question 17 indicate that Project
Managers/Officers perceive a difference in th^ effectiveness
of" various TSE facilities. Results of personal interviews
by Pare personnel contained in Reference. 31 indicate that
NWC, China Lake, had a better liaison group and were easier
to work with during project assignments. Question 17
substantiated these opinions since NHC enjoyed a position of
number 1 in the eyes of the users. Perhaps the key for
facilities to improve Project Managers' perception of their
effectiveness would be to exert more effort towards
formulating a closer working relatioship with Project
Managers
.
Responses to the three cost guestions, 9, TO, and 16,
appear to indicate some significant facts. Cost estimates
are not the number one factor in importance for selecting a
facility. Most managers are aware of the masking effect
different funding techniques have on total costs incurred.
The disturbing feeling caused by a 38,% no opinion response
on question 9 might just be explained by the results given
in questions 10 and 16. Managers in 1b appear to express a
lack of crcditability in cost estimates proposed by the
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facilities for T&E projects. This attitude coupled with the
clouding of true costs by the different accounting
techniques might generate within managers a feeling of
confusion and disinterest towards the fiscal area.
Question 16 addressed the area of facilities* selection
criteria. Ls mentioned, cost considerations did not receive
the importance anticipated. Technical capability was
clearly considered the most important parameter in the
selection process. Question 13 pointed out that 75% of the
Projsct Managers felt there existed a significant difference
in the technical expertise of TSE facilities offering
comparable services. The next section will address this
area and propose a method of objectively rating the various




Results of the questionnaire indicate that for many
weapon systems: more than one TSE facility was capable of
fulfilling the TSE requirements for a particular project.
Results also indicated that technical capability was trie
most important parameter in selection of a facility to
perform a weapon system's TSE. There now exists, within
DoD, 26 major TSE facilities, many of which are capable of
fulfilling the TSE requirements of a specific project. To
the best of the authors' knowledge, no method presently
exists to objectively appraise the technical suitability of
these facilities for a particular project.
This chapter will address the question of which TSE
facility is most technically capable of fulfilling the TSE
requirements of a particular project. Solution to the
question is addressed through use of a systems analysis
format (statement of objective, assumptions, and measure of
effectiveness) . Through a systems analysis approach this
chapter demonstrates an objective method of selecting tae
appropriate facility for a particular weapon scenario. In
particular, this chapter presents a functional capabilities
measurement of those TSE facilities capable ox providing TSS
to projects involved in aircraft/weapon systems.
The functional capabilicies of the selected facilities
is quantified based on an. appraisal of qualitative data.
The data was based on tha results of recent trios conducted
by PMTC personnel to appraise the technical capabilities of
other TSE facilities. It roust be emphasized that cost
considerations are ignored and that technical capabilities




The objective of this analysis is as follows:
"Selection of the facility most capable of
satisfying the TSE requirements of an
aircraft/missile weapon system in a capability
restrained environment."
1 • Lislt at ions
tfarely, if ever, does one facility possess all the
equipment/technical capability required to meet the needs of
a specific project. This paper limits its analysis to
selection of the facility which can perform the majority of
the services based upon current resources. In order to
overcome this limitation a project manager has two major
alternatives:
a) Additional funding for facility capability
expansion.
b) Selection of secondary facilities capable of
providing the specific tests not available at the primary
facility.
The restriction of the weapon system to
aircraft/missile is necessitated by the limitations of data
available. Point Mugu, whose primary mission is the T&E of
airborne weapon systems, is the prime scource of data.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
1 • One T&E facility, is the "P_rirce contractor^
As mentioned previously no one facility has all the
resources available to meet the total requirements of a
project. Normally one (load) facility handles the majority
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of the T&E requirements and farms out to "subsidiary"
facilities specific tasks under the cognizance of the
Project Manager.
2. More than one facility can satisfy the T&E
££3uir_effient s °£ §. BLQimitz.
Although the upper echelon executives of DoD may claim
that there is little duplication of capabilities within the
Department this is not so. It cannot be denied that some
weapon systems are so unique that the T&E requirements can
only be met by one facility. It is not these particular
systems to which this study is directed. The survey
conducted by the authors indicates that many Project
Managers feel that more than one facility was capable of
meeting the T&E requirements of his project. The survey was
used to make an assessment of the T&E process currently
employed by the Project Manager. A copy of the survey is
included as Appendix B. Results are analyzed in Chapter Y.
Section B.
3. EE2J£ct Manager l_s selection not subject to
H2Bzf ilBctional constraints^
This analysis presupposes that a Project Manager's
selection criterion is based solely on functional
capabilities. Other overriding considerations may limit a
Project Manager's selection to a less functionally suitable
facility. Cost limitations may rostict selection to a
facility which can provide only marginal service. The
optimum facility may not be able to accept another project
due to a backlog of work assignments. Political pressure
beyond a Project Manager's control may force selection of a
suboptiaial facility including pressure from higher
authority. A Project Manager may copsider additional
capabilties more important in the selection.
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**• P£.2JS£i 11§J1^3§£ IS motivated to find the optimal
facility, for his T£E needs..
It is assumed that the Project Manager is willing to
use an objective criterion in selecting a facility to
satisfy his future T&E requirements. The survey conductor
indicates a high dependence on familiarity of facilities
from previous assignments as a selection criterion.
Personal interviews conducted with Project Officers show
that some Project Officers felt quite adament about using
the same T5E facility they've used in the past and no matter
what the capabilities of other facilities are they would
continue to use the same facility in the future. Here it is
recognized that preconceived notions have an affect on
making an objective decision and that a certain degree of
bias cannot be avoided.
5« Project within the cognizance of NAVMAT
Analysis will be limited to those projects identified
strictly as Navy projects under the purview of the Navy
Material Command ( NAVMAT) , This avoids analysis of joint
projects which are concurrently developed by more than one
service. The authors' unf amiiiarity with Air Force/Army
procurement particulars preclude their inclusion.
6. Costs are not considered in selection.U
Although it would be unreasonable to assume that costs
should be ignored in the selection process the survey.
indicates that technical capability significantly outweighs
considerations of cost estimates in the selection decision.
Project Managers also agree that the different funding




Since a cost analysis is not feasible at this time it
must be recognized that the computer program does not
utilize cost as a parameter* In particular, funding at T&E
facilities is in a transitional stage due to the recent
enactment of the Uniform Funding Policy (1974) and the
instituting of RIF at these activities.
7. Paraochialism should not be a selection criterion
The feeling that Navy projects should go to Navy
facilities should not be allowed to creep into an objective
selection criterion. Although facilities may have priority
methods that favor their individual Service this
consideration should be dealt with after an objective
decision has been made.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL
In order to provide a basis for relating the many
aspects of capability assessment it is necessary to
establish some common denominator. A common denominator
which satisfies the requirement for this application is a
set of functional capabilities. Investigation into PMTC
tasks and interviews conducted led to a determination of the
set of 26 mutually exclusive members as developed in
Reference 32. This set is intended to exhaust the
capabilities of a Test & Evaluation activity, including an
orgranization as large as PMTC, in terms of
functions/services.
The 26 functions are:
1. Trajectory- Provide precision position measurements
in space, air, surface, and underwater by active or passive
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electromagnetic means, optical means, or acoustical means.
This includes radar, optics, underwater tracking, missile
impact location systems, LORAC, and passive tracking
systems:
2. Telemetry- Provide for the collection and display of
engineering parameters such as onboard inertial data,
environmental data, scalar miss distance, and other
performance data by passive electromagnetic means.
3. Command Control- Provide command control, including
flight termination control of vehicles and missiles, and the
remote control of targets and unmanned vehicles.
**• Geophysics- Provides environmental data, including
geodetic surveys and meteorological and oceanographic
measurements.
5- Freguency Management- Provide coordination,
monitoring, and engineering services for electromagnetic
freguencies within assigned areas- This function includes
command freguency management, operation freguency support,
and area frequency coordination.
6« £ii£tography- Provide photographic, television, and
technical services required to support the documentation and
surveillance of events occurring at and about the field
activity and the test range as well as the instrumentation
support of static and dynamic ground and airborne testing
and evaluation activities.
?• Launching- Provide launching of missiles, test
vehicles, and targets and the ground support including
ordnance for launched systems.
8. Hecovery- Provide air, surface, and underwater
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location and retrieval services.
9. QESrational Com a;unica tions- Provide necessary
tele-commprovide capability to conduct and control, and
display data for all operations, unication systems for the
conduct of operations.
10. Operational Control- This includes range
surveillance and clearance, tactical data and real-time
display, timing, range safety, range control, and range
scheduling.
11. Threat Simulations- Provide support to the weapons
systsms acguisiticn programs for developing, testing^ and
evaluation aerial and surface targets simulating realistic
threat environments. 7
12. Technical Services- Provide prototype fabrication,
modifications, repairs, calibration, acceptance tests, and
tenant range services and depot level maintenance to
existing equipment and provide open shop computer services
for all authorized external reguestors.
13. Internal £ecjinicj.l Services- All effort internal to
the activity, but not directly identifiable with the above
functional categories. This effort will be prorated to the
functions: trajectory through threat simulations.
14. Facilit ie s/ U til j ties Support- Provide for the
maintenance and repair of roads, buildings, grounds, and
eguipment, and the provision of utility services including
water, power, telepnone, and waste collection and disposal
systems.
15. Logistics- Provide for supply support services and
the operation and maintenance of systems which transport
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material and personnel by land, sea, or air. Provide
nesessary engineering, management and technical services to
maintain and support integrated logistic support plans for
assigned equipment.
16. Air Operations- Provide for the operation and
maintenance of all-weather airfields including fire fighting
and crash crew support, flight support services including
air traffic control, fueling, other line maintenance and air
terminal; and search and rescue.
17- Military Community Services- Provide services such
as senior officer present/area coordinator, legal, chaplain,
dental, recreation, family housing, bachelor enlisted
guarters, bachelor officer quarters, and clubs for military
personnel.
18. Security- Provide for the administration and
maintenance of a security program for physical security, law
enforcement, disaster control, and classified material
control.
19. Non-operational Communications- Provide for the
administration, operation, and maintenance of long range and
fixed point-to-point telecommunications.
20. Administration and Management- This function
includes all Command Staff functions invoJ ving resource and
program management, personnel and financial support
services, managment systems and data processing
21- Threat Assessment- Provide for the acquisition,
analysis, and assessment of performance and characteristic
data on aerial target and threat systems and the
determination of the requirements, capabilities, and
applications of aerial targets systems for simulated
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threats. Support to the aerial target user community with
technical information concerning the translation of threat
parameters and weapon system TSE plans to specific target
requirements.
22. Software Support- Provide for the management,
functional, and technical support of all computer programs,
independent of their storage media, associated with airborne
weapon systems, and related design, analysis, and
documentation.
23. W^iLESD. Systems Test and Evaluation- Provide the
operational planning, preparation of eguipment and
resources, and performance of engineering ground and
airbrone testing in static, dynamic, integrated, or
simulated modes to acquire pertinent data to be analyzed for
evaluation of procedures, processes, capabilities, and
characteristics of weapon systems. The determination of
design, operational, and compatibility limitations or
deviations as they effect the development and production
decisions in the weapon systems acquisition cycle.
24. Production Support- Provide the aggregate of
engineering assistance required by a cognizant field
activity in support of an ongoing production program
involving equipments for which it has been assigned
engineering cognizance.
25. Engineering Services- Provide basic engineering
services for design, development, test and evaluation, and
product quality assessment in support of the development,
production, and operational phases of weapon systems. The
services include engineering consideration of compatibility
,
safety, reliability, maintainability, and performance to
establish the value of the weapon systems.
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26. Aircraft ?liilLl§ll§.I12S PeEartraent- Provide
intermediate level maintenance on all aircraft assigned to
the facility, contractor hailed aircraft, tenant activities,
and transient aircraft; and to provide organizational level
maintenance to the activity aircraft, and transient
aircraft.
There are 26 major TSE/range facilities able to act as
the lead activity in a weapon system TSE program. These are
identified in DoD Directive 3200.11 of June 18, 1974.
1. National Ranges. Those major DoD ranges and test
facilities which are unique national assets designed to
support requirements of major DoD programs.
Na t ional Ranges Services
White Sands fissile Ranges USA
Kwajalein Missile Range USA
Pacific Kissile Test Center USN
National Parachute Test Range USN
• Eastern Test Range USAF
Space and Missile Test Center USAF
Satellite Control Facility USAF
Arnold Engineering Development Center USAF
2. DoD Major Test Facility. Those other major DoD
test facilities which support, almost entirely, DoD
requirements.
Test Facilities Services
Dugway Proving Ground USA
Arctic Test Center USA
Tropic Test Center USA
i
Yuma Proving Ground USA
Jefferson Proving Ground USA
Electronic Proving Ground USA
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Aberdeen Proving Ground USA
Atlantic Underwater T&E center USH
Naval Air Test Center USH
Naval Air Propulsion Test Center USN
Naval Air Test Facility USN
Naval Weapon Center USN
Atlantic Fleet Weapon Range USN
Air Force Special Weapons Center USAF
Tactical Fighter Weapon Center USAF
Air Force Flight Test Center USAF
Armament Development Test Center USAF
Air Defense Weapon Center USAF
Not all 26 facilities are capable of supporting similar
weapon systems T&E, but are restrained to one or more
dif ferentiable categories such as air related systems,
ballistic missiles, ordnance, and climatic tests*
Consideration of an activity for T&E work is limited in
scope to those organizations with related mission
statements, technical capabilities, and expertise in the
broad weapon systems classes.
One particular segment of activities renders T&E
support of some degreee towards aircraft/missile related
systems. It is this general weapon system area and
corresponding T&E activities that forms the boundary of
alternatives available for this particular selection
analysis. This particular area of selection was predicated
on availability of in-formation from a T&E activity within
this segment, PHTC. Of the 26 major T&E/range facilities 13
of them perform functions similar to PMTC.
Table I is a matrix representing the 26 functional
capaoilities and the 1<4 similar/competing activities.
Exiscing capability is indicated by an
.
x and a lack is
represented by a blank space.
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Severe data and quantitative measurement limitations
are evident in attempting to rate a possible 26 functional
capaoilities at 14 competing facilities. It was mandatory to-
further reduce the number of similar T&E activities
available to a Project Manager for selection to the ones
whose functions have been examined. Information was obtained
on seven of the fourteen organizations. The seven activities
are: PMTC, Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC)
,
Eglin AFB, Uaval Air Test Center (NATC) , Patuxent River,
Atlantic Fleet Weapon Range (AFWR) , Roosevelt Roads, Yuma
Proving Grounds, Naval Weapon Center (NWC) , China Lake.
Determination of a quantitative measuring technique for
evaluating activities* functions was discovered to be
impractical. The amount of technical expertise and T&E
experience needed to understand the various 26 functions
coupled with the lack, of a common capability comparison data
base among facilities precluded the utilization of a
quantitative measuring method.
A qualitative rating scheme was substituted. The scheme
was developed by having individuals (at PMTC) familiar with
T&E and its respective facilities render a judgement,
subjective in nature, upon those activities' functional
capabilities (Ref, 33) . Credance in their evaluation is
centered upon two known facts. The first element is the
individual's experience in T&E and his present work function
as a program analyst. The second item is the recent
completion of field trips to the six identified















































XXX X X X X
XXXXXXXXXXXX X
XXXXXXXXXXXX X
XXXXXX X XXX X




XXXX X X X
XXXXX XXX X
XXXX XXX XXX X
XXXX X X X X
XXXXXX X X
XXXXXX X X X X
Table I. Facility Capability Matrix
"X" denotes existence of capability at above facilities.
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The team was asked to apply a qualitative rating scale
consisting of four categories; better, average, worse, or,
no capability, to each of the functions present at the
facilities visited. Average was defined as the typical level
of capability existing for a specified function after
surveying all the facilities; due to the subjectivity of the
investigation, no one activity should necessarily represent
the average. Better and worse classifications were easily
perceived by the team relative to the average. A modified
ordinal scale was selected as the "yardstick" best suited to
a subjective qualitative rating technique. A cardinal scale,
representative of a quantitative scale with well defined
intervals, could not be adapted to a judgemental rating
scheme.
An arithmetic method was needed for the transformation
of a qualitative ranking into a numerical score. The ordinal
scale easily adapted itself to a numerical scoring process
and values of to 3 were assign to the 4 classes in this
order: no capability, 1 worse, 2 average, and 3 better-
Transformation from a qualitative to numerical scoring
permits the utilization of . a crude measure of effectiveness,
(MOE> . A HOE is necessary for satisfying the requirements
of assigning weighting factors to the 26 functional
capabilities; and, to reach a conclusion as to the overall
standings of the alternative activities.
Utilization of this MOE was permitted only after
recognizing three existing limitations: its subjectivity,
lack of a well defined interval to determine how much better
is better from average and average from worse, and a rater's
biasing. Personnel rendering their opinion on the seven
facilities' functional capabilities are members of PMTC and
as such may have some presuppose tendencies towards favoring
PMTC. The ordinal value points assigned gives only an
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opinion as to the relative position of the specific
functions at one activity to the others. It does not
indicate the degree of sa tisf ication of a test requirement
which might be obtained at the facility.
Subjective rating scores of the various activities'
functional capabilities by the visiting team are listed in
table II. The qualitative judgement scheme used prohinits
any futher computational analysis of the scores, excluding
totalling the points, such as determining a numerical mean
either by function or overall.
Actual assignment of value points to the capability
matrix were by necessity qualitative in nature. Within a
functional element it is felt that consistency exists; i.e.,
relative difference in a functional capability between
facilities with assigned values of 2 and 3, respectively, is
approximately the same as uetween facilities with assigned
values of 1 and 2, respectively. However within an activity
it is difficult to justify whether the assignment of a 1 or
2 in one function is analogous to awarding a 1 or 2 to
another function. Since the availability of data constrains
the research to this form of information, an assumption is
made that a well defined ratio exists between functional
capabilities' assigned value points. Sensitivity analysis
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The computer program (Appendix C) is designed to
determine a facility's ability to support a given project
through a simple linear relationship.
The project is initially analyzed to determine the
degree of importance of each of the 26 functions in the
completion of its T&2. Based on this analysis, weighting
factors are assigned to each funtional category. These
factors are then combined with the previously defined
capability matrix to form the Linear Summation Equation. For
example:
EFAC = FUNC(i) x CFAC (i)
where EFAC is the effectiveness index of a facility, FUNC(i)
is the weighting factor assigned to each functional category
for the project, and CFAC (i) is the assessed capability of
the facility in each of the 26 categories.
The optimal facility is then the facility with the
highest effectiveness in lex. This index can, as previously
noted, be subjected to a sensitivity analysis and be
combined qualitatively with other factors such as cost,
availability, etc.
The program also has the capability to do a sensitivity
analysis. The weighting factors for each category may be
varied by a constant ratio, CAT1, CAT2, etc. or a constant,




E. SPECIFIC WEAPON SCENARIO
The weapon system to be tested is an air-to-air short-
range, dog-fight type missile with passive homing
capabilities (infra-rod) and its launch vehicle an F-14/VFAX.
The missile should be capaole of being launched effectively
within all points of the aircraft combat envelope against
multiple targets. The missile has a 25 "g" turn capability,
10 miles maximum range, and ttach <4 speed. Targets should be
representative of current Soviet combat aircraft (HIG 21
,
MIG 23, KIG 25, Su 9, Blinder)
.
1 . Specific Requirements
The specific requirements of the test and
evaluation are:
a. Base two fighter aircraft, at the test site and
provide hangar, fuel, oil, ground support equipment, etc.
needed.
b. Provide housing, messing, transportation to
support pilots, crew, and technicians. A total of 30 people.
c. Provide ordnance storage, handling, missile
assembly and checkout for 2 missiles.
d. Provide threat simulation matching the targets
mentioned above as closely as possible including multiple
(2-4) target presentation.
e. Provide communication and command control of
targets to oresent realistic maneuvering capabilities while
guaranteeing the safety of launch vehicle crew.
f. Provide six channel telemetry for data
collection and missile evaluation.
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g. Provide an airborne photographic package
capable of documenting missile shots and target maneuvering.
h. Provide limited technical services in the area
of T&E support for this weapon system.
i. Provide data processing for test results.
j. Program expected to be completed six months
from arrival on base.
2- Task Cat egories
In order to ensure consistency and establish a basis
for sensitivity analysis, the 26 functions were grouped into
4 categories as follows:
a * mission Support- those functional









D » Test Requirements- those functional






















c. Technical Support- those functional
capabilities providing the technical "logistics" necessary
to satisfy the T&E requirements:
(1.) Engineering Services





(7.) Weapon System T5E
d. Base Support- those functional capabilities
necessary to support routine military operations:
(1.) Administration and Management
(2.) Facilities/Utilities
(3.) Logistics
(4.) Military Community Services
(5.) Hon-Operational Communication -
<6.) Security
3- Weightin g Factors
Depending on the weapon scenario selected, each of
the functional capabilities has a different degree of
importance and, therefore, has a different weighting in
deteL mining the overall effectiveness function for each
facility. Although subjective, a logical and consistent
approach to assigning weighting factors must be selected. A
hierachy of importance was initially chosen as shown in
Table III. The functional capabilities were ordered from
least important to most important. In this instance both
Internal Technical Services and Production Support were not
required and v/ere assigned a weighting of zero. Both
Frequency Management and Management and Administration were
considered next in importance. This process was continued
down the line until the last and most important functional




This initial approach to assigning weighting
factors' was considered too restrictive. Each functional
capability was assigned a discreet weighting factor,
incrementally rated one unit more important than the
preceding functional capability/capabilities. Depending on
the decision maker's familiarity with the requirements of
the scenario in guestion, he may feel that more than one
unit degree of importance should be assigned to some
capabilities. For this particular scenario it was felt that
Command Control should be placed two increments over the
preceding category and that Telemetry should be placed three
units over Command Control. The results are presented in
Table IV. In this particular case, the weighting factors
now range from to 15. Other personnel, more qualified to
perform the weighting assignment, might, feel comfortable
with a more expanded scale. An organization such as NAVAIR
0-6 may be able to expand the scale significantly and thus
provide for a more sensitive analysis of the data.
To provide a check on the adequacy of the
weighting factors, the summation of weighting factors within
each general category should be compared. For this scenario





The weighting of each general category seemed to
reflect its relative importance, so, for this particular
scenario, no reassessment of the task categories totil
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weighting factor scores was considered necessary. It" it was
felt that a reassessment was necessary, an iterative
approach to reassigning weighting factors would be
apprDpriate. A later section will address this approach in
the sensitivity analysis.
It must be emphasized that these totals are
directly related to the scenario depicted. A weapon system
which greatly pushes the state-of-the-art might, for
example, require a much higher value in Technical Support
whereas a system involving a great number of people might
require a higher total ic Base Support.
4. Data Usage
Once the weighting factors were assigned, they were
placed into the Linear Summation Equatipn from which the
computer program outputted an ordered ranking of facilities
by technical capabilities. Depending on the degree of
confidence the decision maker places on his weighting
assignment, he may want to input another set of weighting
factors to ascertain if they will affect the results. This
approach is addressed in the next section, the sensitivity
anal/sis. If the new set of weighting factors affects the
effectiveness ordering of the facilities, a reassessment of
critcal factors is needed. If the order is unaffected, no
further assessment for determining facilities' technical




1. Internal Technical Services
Production Support
2. Frequency Management 1
















9. Air Operations 8
10. Threat Simulation 9
11. Trajectory 10
Operational Control 10
Weapon Systems Test & Evaluation 10
12. Command Control 11
13. Telemetry 12
Table III. Hierarchy of Functional Capabilities
Rating of the 26 functional capabilities from least to
most important in numerical order.
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FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY WEIGHTING FACTORS
1
.










9. Operational Communications 3
10. Operational Control 10
11. Threat Simulation 9
12. Technical Services 6
13. Internal Technical Services
14. Facilities/Utilities 3
15. Logistics 2
16. Air Operations 8
17. Military Community Services 3
13. Security 4
19. Non-Operational Communications 2
20. Administrative and Management 1
21. Threat Assessment . 6
22. Software Support 6
23. Weapons Systems Test S Evaluation 10
24. Production Support
25. Engineering Services 3
26. Aircraft Maintenance 6
Table IV. Rating of Functional Capabilities




F. RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A computer solution (Appendix C) was obtained for the
example outlined using the stated values. In addition,
initial sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying the
category totals in such a manner as to keep the total point
value of 145 constant. In all cases the Base Support
category was held constant since it was felt its assigned
value accurately depicted its importance. Changes were
uniformly made on all elements within a category by inputing
a ratio value into CAT1 through CAT4. Alteration of CAT1
through CAT4 investigated the sensitivity of total task
categories' assigned values.
The first two cases show the effect of first decreasing
Test tfeguirements by 16 percent and then increasing it by
the same amount and evenly distributing the difference to
Mission Support and Technical Support.
The next two cases depict the subtraction and then the
addition of 20 percent (8 points) on Mission Support.
Constant point value was maintained by evenly distributing
the difference to Test Requirements and Technical Support.
The final two cases depict a similar subtraction and
addicion of 20 percent (6 points) on Technical Services.
In all cases above the relative ranking order remained
constant, although the absolute difference in scores
changed. ADTC closely challenged PMIC throughout the
analysis for the number one position. A maximum difference
in scores between the two facilities remained within three
percent. The analysis shows that the values placed on
category totals is not highly critical to end results
throughout a reasonable range of values (15-20 percent).
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Weighting factors within a task category were next
changed independently by inputing an adjustment vector
VAR (i) . Throughout this analysis the total weighting factor
of each task category was held constant. This analysis
assumed a properly assigned category total but checks the
sensitivity of assigned functional values within a category.
In this example only the values with in the Test Requirement
category were altered but similar analysis could be
performed on the other three categories.
First, 5 points were subtracted from the Telemetry
value and 1 point was added • to each of the other five
functional areas. It should be noted that this altered the
functional hierarchy within the category by placing
Telemetry subordinate to Command Control. Next, the
category hierarchy was held constant by subtracting 1 point
from Command Control and 3 points from Telemetry and adding
1 point to each of the other four areas. Finally, all areas
within the category were uniformly assigned a value of 10
points.
Results indicate no change in the hierarchy of
facilities' totals and little relative change between two
consecutive facilities. In this scenario the tas«: category
total seems to be the dominated factor and little
sensitivity is shown by manipulating each of the sir.
variables within the Test Requirement category. Sone
facilities had the same values assigned in their capability
vector in all effected functional area and thus showed no
change in effectiveness total (eg. WSMR) .
Thus it appears that once the faclitiess are accurately
rated by functional capabilities, a Project Manager may




Suitable facility selection for adequate testing of
weapon systems is an important prerequisite to acquiring
combat functional weaponry. The present method of selection
has drawbacks due to the subjectivity of the selection
process; parameters somewhat irrelevant to proper selection
frequently weigh heavily in the final selection. If the
Navy is to improve its system acquisition process a more
ob-jective criterion must be implemented in the selection
process.
This analysis has demonstated a rational method of
objectively assessing the functional suitability of a
facility for fulfilling- the TSE requirements of a particular
project. Time constraints and data limitations restricted
the detail and objectivity of the analysis. In particular,
the data source was based on the opinions of personnel
attached to the same facility. This may inherently sway
their impressions of competing facilities. The restrictive
- 3 rating scale employed eliminated the possibility of
distinguishing between capabilities that were just above
average and those that were totally superior tc tneir
competitors. The sensitivity analysis points out the
importance of an expanded rating scale since weighting
factor variations as large as 20 percent were ineffective in
altering the overall ranking. It is believed that if more
objectivity and an expanded rating scale were employed a
differentiation in ranking would have resulted.
Follow-on study is recommended in this area since the
analysis presents a straight forward method of ranking
facilities through a weighted linear summation of 26
identifiable functional capabilities. To reduce bias,
personnel at the NAViiAT or DoD level should conduct a
survey of TSE facilities and rank the functional
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capabilities on a scale of - 10. If a facility expands
its functional capabilities or for some other reason feels a
higher rating is warranted the facility could appeal for a
review of its ranking in the questionable areas. This
ranking method could also provide useful feedback to
facilities for determining their relative effectiveness and
help identify areas needing improvement. When a Project
Manager determines his T&E requirements a few computer carls
could provide him with a list of the most qualified
facilities.
This analysis does not pretend to propose the ultimate
solution to the decision maker. Prior to final selection
the Project Manager might have to weigh other less tangible
considerations or parameters not yet identified by the
analysis such as costs, time, and scheduling problems.
However, this type of analysis reduces the difficulty of
making the proper selection.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter states what was accomplished by the
research in view of the five objectives covered in the
introduction. An attempt is also made, where applicable, to
recommend improvements and to point out areas where
additional research could be accomplished.
A. WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS
Research of current directives showed that T&E facility
missions were not clearly defined and thus some overlap
existed. NAVMATINST 5450 T 27 acknowledges the existence of
overlap and encourages a limited amount of competition.
Although the Project Manager is granted a great amount
of authority and responsibility by a Project Charter, few
procedures seem to be clearly defined in the T&E facility
selection process. Current directives seem to stimulate a
buyer-seller relationship between the PM and the T&E
facility.
Previous attempts, such as the establishement of TECO,
have been unsuccessf ull in providing for overall
coordination of T&E within NAVAIR. The establishment of
AIR-06 is an attempt to strengthen this coordination, but
its effectiveness remains to be tested. There appears to be
a problem of overlapping r9sponsibilities in the control of
resources inherent in rue proposed system due to the
double-hatting of 06T and 06R as pointed out in Chapter III.
B. FACILITY ORGANIZATION
In order for an organization to be effective it must b<
responsive and adaptable to its changing external
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environment. This is particularly true of T&E facilities
which are so intimately involved witn a rapidly changing
technology. The stagnation that has hampered operations at
the Point Mugu complex must be set aside. The PMTC
organization is structured to avoid stagnancy and to be
reactive to its users' needs. However, an organization cm
only be as effective as the people working for it. Only
time can determine if the personnel are willing to
participate in its dynamic development.
C. EFFECTS OF FUNDING METHODS
The authors had the impression that the primary driving
force behind a PM's selection of a T&E facility was cost.
Research into the means by which activities receive their
funds revealed that there are two major financial management
techniques used by facilities. They are NI? and RMS.
Additionally, the major T&E facilities, as specified in
DODDIR 3200,11, have procedures and regulations governing
their funding as a result of being MRTF3 members. In
general, then, a T&E facility is either under NIP or RMS for
its financial management and receives its funds either from
NIF or HRTFB/lnstitutional Funds.
NIF appears to £>e a more dynamic managerial method than
RMS. NIF requires an activity to receive its operating
funds through the sale of goods and services to customers.
This causes several economic consequences: formation of a
buyer-seller relationship, a need for customers, a need to
ensure their satisfaction, and the formulation of a
competitive environment. RMS, in contrast to NIF, only
encourages a faciltiy to efficiently use its resources. An
RMS activity is thus guaranteed of a user for its services




The difference in funding policy causes different
charges to the user as discussed in Chapter IV.
D. PROJECT MANAGERS' PARTICIPATION
Respones from the guestionnaire indicated that
technical capabilities an installation can offer for a
project was the most important criterion used by decision
makers in selecting a T&E facility. In contrast to the
authors' original assumption, cost estimates were not number
one but a distant third after technical capability and
personnel expertise.
A Project Manager has considerable latitude in
selecting a T&E facility and is not normally hampered by
external constraints such as project urgency or higher
authority prior selection. As was expected, he could be
limited in his selection process by technical constraints
to, possibly, one facility; and, approximately 45 percent of
the PMs were. In addition to the latitude a PM enjoys
during initial facility selection, he can, later on, alter
the selection to another facility.
The process used by Project Managers to learn of an
installation's capability was based heavily upon past
experience and associar.es. Next in importance was the
liaison offices established in Washington. The liaisons
were used by a majority of the PMs, but the services could
be improved. Reference 31 indicated that some liaison
offices were better than others, which would have a direct
influence on a Project Manager's perception of that
facility. Publications were not considered a useful
information source by the managers.
Project Managers do not desire a competitive
1 37

environment in T&E. They believe the cost of T&E would be
reduced if competition among facilities were eliminated.
This view is in conflict with NAVMATINST 5U50.27 which
expressed the opinion that limited competition is both
necessary and good for T&E.
Responses from the questionnaire indicated a clear
preference for NWC and the services it offers over other
comparable facilities. This high degree of satisfaction
with NWC was held by both Project Managers and Project
Officers. It would be to the benifit of other facilities to
investigate this finding further and determine the reasons
behind the NWC number one ranking.
E. AN OBJECTIVE SELECTION PROCESS
The facility selection process developed in Chapter VI
provides a systematic means by which a PM could determine
which facility is most technically capable of handling his
project. The 26 functional areas defined by PMTC personnel
seem to exhaust the capabilities of a T&E facility in terns
of services. Although it is recognized that the point
totalization could be hand calculated, the computer program
aids greatly in a sensitivity analysis of weighting factors.
There exists a need to make an objective determination-
of a facility's rating in each of the 26 areas and a method
of updating it. This could oe effectively accomplished by an
organization such as AIR-06.
Additional research could be done in developing a more
objective and easily understandable method of assigning
project weighting factors. This might be done by a form
which asks specific questions concerning the number of
personnel to be based incident to a project etc. and
136

assigning point values accordingly.
It. must be emphasized that the process is based on
technical capability, only, and does not address itself to





PHR Financial Budget FY 74-81
(in million of dollars)
74 75 76 7T 77
Operations
Institutional 73.97 68.70 78.92 21.38 85.53
Direct Charges 8.0 20.55 19.53 5.19 20.76
Range Improvements
Institutional 5.2 12.29 9.8 3.15 24.85
Others 3.67 2.54 11.64 1.21 8.41
TOTALS 90.84 104.08 119.89 30.93 139.55
78 79 80 81
Operations
Institutional 87.33 88.35 88.72 89.46
Direct Charges 20.76 20.76 20.76 20.76
Range Improvements
Institutional 23.84 20.10 18.92 5.46
Others 8.09 4.08 1.08 0.0
TOTALS 140.51 133.29 129.48 115.68
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information on the capabilities of T&E facilities.
6. Liaisons from T&S facilities provide a useful source
of information on the capabilities of their facilities.
7. A project manager's previous assignments provide a
valuable source of Information on the capabilities
of T&E facilities.
8. Staff assistance within a system command Is useful
in determining the capabilities of T&E facilities.
9. There is a significant difference in costs to projects
from T&E facilities offering comparable services.
10. Different funding techniques (KIP/RMS, etc. ) used by
T&E facilities tend to mask the actual T&E cost of
a project.
TEST A1JD EVALUATION ASSESSMENT
Please enter the most appropriate number in the box at
the right of each statement.
l.=Stronc-ly Agree 2.= Agree 3«=No Opinion *+.= Dl sagree 5« = Strongly Disagree
1. More than one Test and Evaluation (T&E) facility was
capable of providing the simlllar services needed for
my project.
2. The technical constraints of my project limited selection
to one T&E facility.
3. The urgency of my project limited selection to one T&E
facility.
**. Current publications provide a useful source of
information en the capabilities of T&E facilities.




Please enter the most appropriate number In the box
at the right of each statement.
l.=Stronp;ly A?ree 2. = A£r_ee 3«=No Opinion U.= D1 sap;ree 5»= Strongly Disagree
11. Once a T&E facility has been chosen for a project a
project manager has no latitude In altering the I |
selection.
NOTE: For the following 3 questions comparable services is
meant to be those services which more than one T&E facility
Is capable of providing in support of a project.
12. As regards to facilities offering comparable services,
there is a significant difference in the information
feedback provided to a project manager to effectively
monitor the progress of his project.
13. There is a significant difference in the technical
expert! se of T&E facilities offering comparable services. | |
lU. As regards to facilities offering comparable services,
there is a significant difference in the ease of obtaining | |
non-routine information on the progress of a project.
15. Funding level for T&E facilities 1 modernization is
adequate to support my project needs.
16. Kank each of the following factors with respect to its















Please enter the most appropriate number In the box at the
right of each statement.
l«=Strong;ly Agree 2.=Agree 3»=No Opinion U.=Dlsagree 5» = ^tronp;Iy Disagree
17. Rank the following T&E facilities In their overall
effectiveness In providing satisfactory services to
project managers.
1. Host effective 8. Least effective
A. Naval Weapon Center, China Lake
B. Pacific Missile Test Center, Pt. Mugu
C. Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River
D. Armament Development and Test Center,
Eglin AFB
E. White Sands Missile Ranee
F. U.S. Army Yuma Proving Grounds
G. Altantlc Fleet Weapons Range
H. Air Force Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB
18. Increased competition among T&E facilities would
increase the effectiveness of services provided to
project managers.
19. Competition among T&E facilities should be eliminated
in order to reduce the additional cost of overlapping
capabilities.
20. Selection of a contractor Influences the selection
of a T&E facility.
21. DCP's are overly restrictive In their testing requirements
and thus limit the project manager's selection to one
T&E facility.
22. Weapon systems T&E requirements are Identified early











When answering the following questions use the appropriate
numerical response as Indicated below.
1.= All 2.= Most 3.= Some k.= Few 5.= None
23. T&E facilities are consistent In their method of
assigning project priorities for completion.
2k. T&E facilities show a genuine Interest In providing
program support for successful completion of the
project.
25. Deficiencies noted by the P.M. in a project's
progress are examined and corrected by the T&E
facilities.
26. T&E facilities caoable of providing services for my
project have shown eagerness for my project.
27. T&E facilities actively participate in the selection
process of weapon system test assignment.
28. What is your rank/GS level?
29* Highest level formal education achieved.
Associate Baccalaureate Waster ( technical
)
Master(non-technical ) Doctorate
30. Wumber of years involved in T&E assignments.
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